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ABSTRACT 
We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces 
a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a 
framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number 
of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we 
characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an 
optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of 
the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the 
equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is 
determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
There is nothing so practical
as a good theory.
- Kurt Lewin
Many real-world situations involve the repeated interaction of a large player and a popula-
tion of small players. For instance, a monopolist (large player) chooses the quality of a product
sold to a large population of customers (small players). By selling a high-quality product, the
monopolist may be able to increase its profits in the long-run by building reputation of being a
good-quality type. This strategy is specially attractive for a large player that is patient and not
only cares about today’s payoff, but also about its long-run payoff.1 The question of whether or
not a large-player can build reputation of being of a certain type when facing a large population
of small players has attracted attention of economists for several decades. Since the classic
work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), the question of reputa-
tion building has been explored in different settings such as discrete-time repeated games with
perfect monitoring (Fudenberg and Levine, 1989), discrete-time repeated games with imperfect
monitoring (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992), and continuous-time games with imperfect monitor-
ing (Faingold and Sannikov, 2011). For most of their analysis, Faingold and Sannikov (2011)
assume that the support of the prior belief of the small players contain only two possible types:
a normal type, a player that is fully strategic, and a commitment type, a type who is committed
to playing a stationary strategy. The contribution of this paper is to extend the framework of
Faingold and Sannikov (2011) by allowing the support of prior belief of the small players to
contain a finite number of multiple commitment types.
The literature on discrete-time repeated games has emphasized the relevance of the support
1Other examples of the role of reputations include government’s monetary policies (Barro (1986)) or time-
inconsistent government policies (Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996)).
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of the prior belief of the small players in the ability of the large player to build reputation.
Consider, for example, this quote in Fudenberg and Levine (1992): “The power of reputation
effects depends on which reputations are a priori feasible and this depends on which types
have positive prior probability.” In their setting, they do not restrict to a single commitment
type and, in fact, some of their results are derived for prior beliefs with full support on all the
possible commitment types. Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) show that when the prior belief of the
small players does not include the Stackelberg type in its support, even with rational learning
after observing long enough histories, the large player cannot build reputation. In their example,
the rational large player does not have an incentive to mimic a bad commitment type because
building reputation would give a lower long-run payoff. Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008)
show that by extending the type space so that the Stackelberg type is included in the support of
the prior belief of the small players, the long-run player can build reputation even in the presence
of bad types. Thus, apart from adding realism to the model, allowing for multiple commitment
types delivers results that diverge from what can be achieved with a single commitment type.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study reputation dynamics in a
continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring with multiple commitment types.
The continuous-time framework, however, permits to fully characterize the equilibrium pay-
offs by using differential equations. In contrast, discrete-time characterization only provides
lower and upper bounds on equilibrium payoffs. Faingold and Sannikov (2011) show the exis-
tence of a unique Markov equilibrium, characterize ordinary differential equation that must be
satisfied by the equilibrium payoff, and show that when the large player is sufficiently patient,
the equilibrium action converges to the commitment action. In other words, they show that
reputation effects exist in the continuous-time framework when there is a single commitment
on the Stackelberg action. With multiple commitment types, Faingold and Sannikov (2011)
provide the diffusion dynamics of the equilibrium belief process and a result on transitory rep-
utation effects, which are analogous results to the ones proven in the discrete-time framework
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by Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004).
We extend the existence result in Faingold and Sannikov (2011) by allowing small players to
hold a prior belief with support on multiple commitment types of the large player. We also show
the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player. Moreover,
we fully characterize the partial differential equation to which the equilibrium payoff function
is the unique solution. In addition, we provide a stochastic representation of the equilibrium
payoff, which has not been shown yet in literature on continuous-time with a single commitment
type. We also establish that, when the large player is patient enough, the equilibrium action is
close to a weighted average of the actions of all commitment types. We also characterize a
sufficient condition on public signals under which reputation effects do not hold even when the
large player is patient enough.
Our main result (Theorem 1) shows that the Markov equilibrium payoff to the rational large
player exists and uniquely determined when there is an arbitrary finite number of commitment
types in the support of an initial prior. Proposition 5 derives a partial differential optimality
equation and an optimality condition that the equilibrium payoff and the equilibrium action
should satisfy respectively. The optimality equation and optimality condition reduce to the
result of Faingold and Sannikov (2011) when there is a single commitment type.2 Proposition
6 implies that a problem with multiple commitment types cannot be reduced to a problem of a
single commitment type because even Bayesian learning cannot eliminate any commitment type
that is in the support of the prior. Therefore, it is meaningful to study the case of multiple types
separately from the case of a single type, which contrasts with the discrete-time literature’s focus
on reputation bounds. Similar to Faingold and Sannikov (2011), we also derive the equilibrium
degeneracy in a complete information game where the large player is certainly believed to be
either a rational type or a specific commitment type.
2In this sense, our Theorem 1 is a generalization of Theorem 4 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011).
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A second contribution of the paper is to provide a stochastic representation of equilibrium
payoffs. Past literature has concentrated on the lower and upper bounds of equilibrium pay-
offs through reputation building. Even in continuous-time with a type space, the literature has
only characterized the optimality equation and the optimal condition, not deriving expressions
for equilibrium payoffs. By using the property that equilibrium beliefs do not arrive at the
boundary of the whole belief space (Proposition 6), Theorem 2 expresses equilibrium payoffs
as an expectation of a discounted sum of flow payoffs up to some moment when the reputation
arrives at where some specific type is believed almost surely to be the large player. Since it
is well-known that, using Monte Carlo methods, the values represented in such a way can be
numerically calculated, this result broadens the application of reputation games to more realis-
tic situations. Furthermore, when there is a single commitment type, we show the opponents’
belief are certainly expected to converge close to the rational type before arriving at being a
commitment type, strengthening the result in Faingold and Sannikov (2011).
Finally, Theorem 3 provides an example showing that, at the behavioral level, the suffi-
ciently patient large player cannot raise the equilibrium payoff to the level of the Stackelberg
payoff by reputation building. In other words, reputation effects do not hold. In the example, the
rational large player’s equilibrium action always stays away from any commitment type’s action
by a non-trivial distance even as the large player grows arbitrarily patient. This result is based
on some conditions on public signals given by Condition 5 that requires, for each commitment
type, a barrier on the belief for public signals not to work properly. Proposition 11 generalizes
Theorem 5 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011) with multiple commitment types, proving that the
large player’s equilibrium action converges to some weighted average of all commitment types’
action as the discount rate goes to zero. However, contrary to the case of a single commitment
type, this result does not tell us that the limit action should be a specific commitment type’s
action because other commitment types are also possible. Faingold and Sannikov (2011) men-
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tion3 that, if such a barrier on reputation exists then, when the posterior touches the barrier,
there would be no changes in reputation and equilibrium actions from that point on. However,
we show that the belief process and the corresponding equilibrium action profiles are almost
surely believed not to hit the barrier. Therefore, even there is a barrier on each belief about
commitment types, we can also expect rich dynamics of Markov equilibria.
1.1 RELATED LITERATURE
This work builds on a rich literature that studies repeated interactions between agents.
Asymmetric patience between agents plays a key role in standard reputation games. The lit-
erature on reputation games can be roughly divided based on the monitoring technology of
long-run/large player’s action and the patience of short-run/small opponents. Some literature
like Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996) study a model between a long-run large player and a
continuum of long-run small opponents. Each small player in a continuum is strategically my-
opic because she can not change public signals individually. Contrast to the small opponents,
they call a large player if he can affect public signals. Hence, a model with a long-run large
player and a continuum of long-run small opponents is equivalent to the canonical reputation
games with public monitoring in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) between a long-run player and
a sequence of short-run players in the sense that opponents, who are either long-run small or
short-run, myopically behave.
Following Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Fudenberg and Levine (1992), several papers
have studied reputation effects in a discrete-time setting. Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996)
show that reputation effects hold in a sufficiently long finitely-truncated dynamic game. With
public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) prove that, for any fixed level of a
discount factor, reputation eventually disappears when the commitment strategy is not a Nash
3See p. 798 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011).
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equilibrium. Even when the opponents’ beliefs are private, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(2007)4 also show the impermanent reputation. These results imply that changing types is
necessary for a permanent reputation.
Other papers relax the standard assumptions of reputation games. One such category is
a reputation game with non-myopic opponents. When the opponents are also long-lived, the
Stackelberg strategy is no longer the best commitment strategy. Nonetheless, Schmidt (1993)
show that the reputation effects also hold when the repeated game features “conflicting inter-
ests”.5 Cripps, Schmidt, and Thomas (1996) study the tight lower bounds, which was shown
to be generally lower than that for canonical reputation games by generalizing Schmidt (1993)
to non-conflicting interests. Celetani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996) also prove
reputation effects by introducing imperfect monitoring about an intended action of less patient
long-lived opponents and a bounded recall to Cripps, Schmidt, and Thomas (1996).
Another category of relaxed reputation games is a model with changing types. When the
type is not stationary,6 Phelan (2006) study cyclic reputation, while Ekmekci, Gossner, and
Wilson (2012) study permanent reputation by using the relative entropy7 introduced by Goss-
ner (2011). Using the relative entropy, Gossner (2011) easily replicate the results of classic
reputation games in Fudenberg and Levine (1992). On the other hand, Watson (1993) and Bat-
tigalli and Watson (1997) study the case of heterogeneous opponents’ beliefs. When the long-
run player could estimate a bounded set where all the heterogeneous beliefs are believed to be
included by some finite time, both showed that reputation effects still hold. Ely and Va¨lima¨ki
(2003) and Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008) study a separating reputation by introducing a
“bad” commitment type. Finally, Mailath and Samuelson (2006) is a well-written introduction
4Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007) study a model with the long-lived opponents.
5We call a game with “conflicting interests” when the commitment strategy of the long-run/large player always
makes the opponents to choose an action that achieves their minimax payoff.
6With changing types, it is no longer possible to use “grain of truth” that plays a main role in literature. See
p. 164 in Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012).
7Relative entropy is a kind of measure of the difference between any two different absolutely continuous
probability distributions. For an introduction to the concept, see Cover and Thomas (2012).
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to reputation games in discrete-time. Mailath and Samuelson (2013) provide a survey of more
recent works in this field.
In contrast to the literature, Faingold and Sannikov (2011) study reputation games in con-
tinuous time. By using Brownian diffusion in continuous-time, they showed the equilibrium
degeneracy in complete information games, which contrasts with the result in Fudenberg and
Levine (1994) that the set of equilibrium payoffs includes a value that is not generated by static
payoffs. Based on methods in Faingold and Sannikov (2011), Bohren (2016) show that a non-
trivial incentive is possible in dynamic games even without introducing any type. Bohren (2016)
posit that the reputation plays a role as a state variable that follows a diffusion process and has
persistent effects on the game. These kinds of continuous-time games build on the influential
works of Sannikov (2007) and Sannikov (2008). By using techniques in stochastic calculus,
Sannikov (2007) and Sannikov (2008) open a new way to the study of the dynamic game and
the principal-agent problem respectively in a rigorous yet more tractable way. Thereafter, many
previous works in discrete-time repeated games have been revisited in continuous-time setting.
Both Bernard and Frei (2016) and Staudigl (2015) extend Sannikov (2007) by allowing for mul-
tiple players. In terms of method, Staudigl (2015) use stochastic viability theory, which we also
apply to our setting.
Reputation games are also related to literature on the Folk Theorem because, by introducing
reputation building in repeated games, the equilibrium payoff in the long-run relationship has
a lower bound that generally exceeds the static Nash equilibrium payoff. Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin (1994) study a standard Folk Theorem in long-run relationships between two long-
lived players. With myopic opponents, Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) also show that,
because of lack of possible punishments on the opponents that is useful to the long-run player,
inefficiency exists. Also, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Levine (2009) study
efficiency in the continuous-time limit when the time interval shrinks.
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Another related literature is on Bayesian learning.8 In the standard reputation games, oppo-
nents update beliefs after observing public histories and reputation effects are heavily dependent
on this learning process. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) show that, by Bayesian learning, long-run
player accurately predict the future play of an infinitely repeated game. Lehrer and Smorodin-
sky (1997) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) provide an example that absolutely continuity9 is not
necessary for weak learning,10 which plays a key role in reputation games with myopic players.
Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996) introduce almost weak learning11 that is also sufficient for rep-
utation effects to hold with myopic opponents. Sorin (1999) study the merging of probabilities.
They provided the reputation bounds shown by Fudenberg and Levine (1992) using the merging
techniques.
The next subchapter 1.2 introduces a simple example explaining the extension to multiple
commitment types is important in reputation games. Subchapter 1.3 describes notations and
preliminary results based on the set-up in Faingold and Sannikov (2011). Chapter 2 extends
the model to case of the multiple commitment types and establishes the existence of a unique
Markov equilibrium. In chapter 3, the stochastic representation of the equilibrium payoff is
derived. Chapter 4 presents the reputation effects at the behavioral level and establishes a con-
dition under which reputation effects fail. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 AN EXAMPLE
Consider a game between a large player and a continuum of small players whose individual
action cannot affect the payoffs. Both the large and the small players are long-lived. Before the
8We also use “rational” learning when players update their belief by Bayesian rule. See Kalai and Lehrer
(1993).
9This is less strict than the “grain of truth” assumption in the merging of probabilities.
10“Weak” is used in the sense that players accurately predict only the next stage.
11“Almost weak learning” implies that weak learning holds only except for zero density of periods. Lehrer and
Smorodinsky (1996) show a diffused belief from the true belief is sufficient for “almost weak learning”.
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start of each t-stage game, the small players learn all of the actions taken previously by all the
small players, but they only observe noisy public signals of the action taken by the large player.
Next, the large player chooses an action at ∈ A = {U,M,D} and each small player i chooses
an action bit ∈ B = {L,C,R}, simultaneously. Then, the stage game payoffs are realized. The
payoff matrix of the static game is shown in Figure 1.
L C R
U (3, 2) (1, 1) (2, 1)
M (2, 2) (4, 3) (3, 1)
D (1, 1) (5, 2) (2, 3)
Figure 1: Static Payoff
The small players do not know the type of the large player, which is in the type space
T =
{
T0,TU ,TM,TD
}
. T0 is the large player’s type who behaves strategically. Tk, k ∈ {U,M,D},
is called a commitment type and corresponds to the type who is believed to choose action k every
period regardless of the small players’ action.12 In this example, if the small players’ prior belief
about a commitment type TM is low, they do not have incentives to choose C. However, when
they believe that large player is a type TM with sufficiently high probability through learning
from public signals, they will choose C instead of L. Knowing this, the large player can build
reputation of being type TM when he is patient enough by choosing M every period.
For simplicity, suppose that all the small players choose the same action at each time and
the aggregate distribution of bit denoted by b¯t is centered on either L, C, or R. The unique Nash
equilibrium strategy in the static game is (U,L). Suppose that the small players are certain
that the large player is a type T0 who behaves fully strategically. With a prior on T0 only, the
equilibrium strategy would be the repetition of (U,L) that yields an equilibrium payoff of 3 at
every stage. This implies that the large player cannot build any other reputation. However, if we
introduce another fixed type of the large player to the support of small players’ prior belief, it
12FS(2011) calls is behavioral type.
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has been known that this result changes. With a non-trivial prior about types of the large player,
small players update their beliefs after observing public signals. Knowing this learning process
of small players, the large player exploits the commitment power, which generates non-trivial
incentives.
For each large player’s action a ∈ A, denote B(a) as a set of best responses chosen by
small players corresponding to an observationally equivalent13 action to a. For any large
player’s static game payoff, g(a, b¯), the generalized Stackelberg payoff is defined by g¯s =
maxa′∈A maxb¯′∈B(a′) g(a′, b¯′) and the Stackelberg action is defined as the action that achieves
g¯s. In this example, the Stackelberg action for the long-run player is M that yields the gen-
eralized Stackelberg payoff of 4. In other words, it is the greatest payoff that a large player
could get with commitment power. This exceeds the payoff of 3 from Nash equilibrium strat-
egy (U,L). Past literature on reputation games with imperfect monitoring has focused on the
fact that, when small players have any positive belief on the large player being a type TM14, the
large player could raise lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff by playing like the type TM.
Moreover, when he is sufficiently patient, the equilibrium payoff would be close enough to the
Stackelberg payoff.
However, these results heavily depend on the assumption that small players have positive
beliefs on the Stackelberg type when the game starts. If small players’ prior does not include the
Stackelberg type in its support, then no matter how long the large type mimics the type, there is
no way for small players to raise his belief that the large player would choose the Stackelberg
action M. For example, suppose that the small players’ prior has a support T 1 = {T0,TD}. In
other words, there is only one commitment type TD on the type space. In this case, the large
player cannot build a reputation of type TM no matter how enough the large player is patient. To
make matters worse, the large player get a payoff of 2 using the commitment power on D, which
13Because of imperfect monitoring, we focus on all the observationally equivalent actions to each action a ∈ A
and the generalized Stackelberg payoff. See p. 785 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011) for definition.
14We call such a commitment type the Stackelberg type.
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is the only possible reputation to build, that is even less than the Nash equilibrium stage payoff
of 3. Theorem 5 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011) demonstrates that only15 when the type space
is T 2 = {T0,TM}, the rational large player’s equilibrium action and payoff converge to M and 4,
respectively, as he becomes sufficiently patient. However, if the type space is T 1 instead of T 2,
by using the same logic in their proof, the rational large player’s equilibrium action and payoff
converge to D and 2, respectively.
On the other hand, this paper allows a type space of T with multiple commitment types so
that the Stackelberg type can be included in the support of the small players’ prior. With the
type space T , Propositon 11 proves that the rational large player’s equilibrium action converges
to some point in co{U,M,D}. Moreover, Theorem 3 in our work shows that the rational large
player’s limit action is bounded away from either U , M, or D, which is dependent on the small
players’ belief.
1.3 NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
As in Faingold and Sannikov (2011) (Henceforce, FS(2011)), a large player lives in in-
finitely periods, who faces a continuum of infinitely lived small players. At each time t ∈ [0,∞),
the large player chooses an action at ∈ A and each small player i ∈ [0,1] chooses bit ∈ B where
both A and B are compact subsets of Euclidean space. Let b¯t ∈ ∆(B) be the aggregate distribu-
tion of small players’ actions {bi}i∈[0,1] where ∆(B) is the space of distributions on B. Every
player observes public signals which are distorted by a Brownian motion.
Definition 1 (FS(2011)) The Public signal
{
Xt
}
t≥0 is represented by the diffusion process
dXt = µ(at , b¯t)dt+σ(b¯t)dZt (1)
15Faingold and Sannikov (2011) state Theorem 5 under the assumption that the single commitment type is the
Stackelberg type. However, their proof of Theorem 5 can be applied to a game with any single commitment type.
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where
{
Zt
}
t≥0 is d-dimensional Brownian motions and both µ(at , b¯t) ∈Rd and σ(b¯t) ∈Rd×d
are Lipschitz continuous functions on A×∆(B) and ∆(B), respectively.
Let
{
Ft
}
t≥0 be the augmented filtration generated by public signals
{
Xt
}
t≥0. In other
words,Ft = σ
{
Xs | 0≤ s< t
}∪Fφ where σ{Xs | 0≤ s< t} is the smallest σ−field generated
by
{
Xs | 0 ≤ s < t
}
and Fφ is the null-set. Each Ft contains all the information known from
observations of public signals up to time t ≥ 0. The following assumption implies σ(b¯) 6= 0.
Hence, we are considering a repeated game with imperfect monitoring as in FS(2011).
Assumption 1 For the diffusion term of public signals σ(b¯), we have
∣∣σ(b¯t)y ∣∣≥ c∣∣y ∣∣, ∀t > 0,
for any y ∈Rd and some c > 0.
Each small player could not affect the signals and the large player is believed to affect only
the drift term µ(·, ·) through action choices. In general, when we suppose that the large player
could affect the diffusion term, small players could estimate at chosen by the large player after
observing enough history by calculating the quadratic variation of public signals.
Definition 2 (FS(2011)) Each small player i has the payoff function
∫ ∞
0
re−rth(at ,bit , b¯t)dt, (2)
where h : A×B×∆B 7→ R is a continuous function. These information is common knowledge
to all players.
A large player’s payoffs are given by
∫ ∞
0
re−rtg(at , b¯t)dt, (3)
where g : A×∆B 7→R is positive, Lipschitz continuous and uniformly bounded.
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The large and small players share the same discount rate r > 0.16 Small players are uncertain
about the payoff function of the large player, believing that the large player is a type Ti ∈{
T0,T1, ...,TK
}
for some K ≥ 1. Type T0 is the normal type who chooses an action profile{
at
}
t≥0 to maximize (3). Type Ti for each i ∈
{
1, ...,K
}
is a commitment type who chooses a
fixed action a∗i ∈ A, independent of t, regardless of the aggregate distribution of actions chosen
by small players.
At the begining of the game, small players hold a common prior belief over the large player’s
types denoted by, θ˜0 =
(
θ0,0,θ1,0, ...,θK,0
)
with ∑Ki=0θi,0 = 1, where θi,0 ∈ [0,1] is the proba-
bility that each small player assigns that the large player is of type Ti. Let
∆K−1 =
{(
θ1,t , ...,θK,t
) ∈RK ∣∣ K∑
k=1
θi,t < 1 and θi,t ∈ (0,1) , i = 1, ...,K, for every t ≥ 0
}
be the set of belief process about the commitment types. Therefore, the belief about the normal
type for each time t, θ0,t , is given by 1−∑Ki=1θi,0. From now on, denote θt =
(
θ1,t , ...,θK,t
) ∈
∆K−1 with 0 < ∑Ki=1θi,t < 1 and θ0,t = 1−∑Ki=1θi,t . Hence, this θt ∈ ∆K−1, which is a vector-
valued belief about commitment types, gives all the information about the belief of being the
normal type, θ0,t . Via Bayesian updating, FS(2011) derive a diffusion process that the posterior
should follow after observing public signals
{
Xt
}
t≥0, which is given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Proposition 5 in FS(2011)) Fix a prior17 p ∈ ∆K−1. A belief process {θt}t≥0 ={
(θ1,t , ...,θK,t)
}
t≥0 with∑
K
i=1θi,t = 1−θ0 for each t is consistent with a strategy profile (at , b¯t)t≥0
if and only if
16In the standard reputation game, it has been usually assumed that the large player is more patient than the
opposite player. For example, Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Cripps, Mailath, and
Samuelson (2004), and Gossner (2011) deal with the case of a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players.
17Faingold and Sannikov (2011) define the prior in (K+1)-dimensional space, ∆K , including the belief about
the normal type. Instead, for our partial differential equation model, we change the belief space to (K − 1)-
dimensional space, ∆K−1, where only the beliefs about commitment types live. Since θ0,t = 1−∑Ki=1 θk,t and
dθ0,t =−∑Ki=1 dθi,t , it is enough to consider beliefs only about commitment types,
{
θi,t
}
1≤i≤K , for each time t ≥ 0
on ∆K−1.
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(a) (θ1,0, ...,θK,0) = p,
(b) for each k ∈ {0,1, ...,K} and t ∈ [0,∞)
dθk,t = γk(at , b¯t ,θt) ·σ−1(b¯t)
(
dXt−µθt (at , b¯t)dt
)
(4)
where θ k =
{
θk,t
}
t≥0 is the probability assigned by small players on a type Tk large player, and
γ0(at , b¯t ,θt)≡ θ0,tσ−1(b¯t)
(
µ(at , b¯t)−µθt (at , b¯t)
)
γk(at , b¯t ,θt)≡ θk,tσ−1(b¯t)
(
µ(a∗k , b¯t)−µθt (at , b¯t)
)
µθt (at , b¯t) = θ0,tµ(at , b¯t)+
K
∑
k=1
θk,tµ(a∗k , b¯t)
We use ∆K−1 as our domain on which the Markov equilibrium payoff is defined. Next, we
define the expected payoffs to the normal type large player at time t > 0 when the large player
and small players follow a given strategy profile.
Definition 3 (FS(2011)) The continuation value of the normal type at time t ≥ 0 is given by:
Wt(S) = Et
{∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)g(as, b¯s)ds
∣∣ T0} (5)
where S =
{
(as, b¯s)
}
s≥0 is a strategy profile.
Let L be the space of all progressively measurable processes α =
{
αt
}
t≥0, such that
E
[∫ T
0 |αs|2ds
]
< ∞ for every 0 < T < ∞.18 FS(2011) characterize a diffusion process of the
continuation value, Wt , by using Martingale representation theorem.19.
18A stochastic process X :Ω×R+→Rd is progressively measurable if X is (P,BRd )-measurable whereBRd
is the Borel set in Rd .
19This result was also shown in Sannikov (2007) in the general two long-run players game.
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Proposition 2 (Proposition 2 in FS(2011)) A bounded process
{
Wt
}
t≥0 is the process of con-
tinuation values of the normal type under a public strategy profile S =
{
(as, b¯s)
}
s≥0 if and only
if for some β =
{
βt
}
t≥0 ∈L such that
dWt = r
(
Wt−g(at , b¯t)
)
dt+ rβt ·
(
dXt−µ(at , b¯t)dt
)
(6)
A public strategy of the normal type is a stochastic process that is progressively measurable
with respect to the augmented filtration
{
Ft
}
t≥0 generated by public signals. FS(2011) also
define a public sequential equilibrium in the case of multiple commitment types.
Definition 4 (FS(2011)) A public sequential equilibrium consists of a public strategy
{
(as,bis)
}
t≥0
for each small player i ∈ [0,1], and a belief process {θt}t≥0 such that at every times t ≥ 0 and
after all histories,
(a) The strategy a =
{
at
}
t≥0 of the normal type large player maximizes his expected payoff:
Et
[∫ ∞
0 re
−rsg(as, b¯s)ds
∣∣ T0]
(b) For each i ∈ [0,1], bit maximizes each small player i’s expected payoff:
∑Kj=0θi,tEt
[∫ ∞
0 re
−rsh(as,bis, b¯s)ds
∣∣ Ti]
(c) Given the common prior
(
θ1,0, ...,θK,0
)
= p ∈ ∆K−1, the belief process {θt}t≥0 is deter-
mined by the Bayes’ rule.
In the diffusion process of public signals (1), note that each small player can not affect
public signals. Hence, even in the dynamic game, each choice variable, bit , is a maximizer of
the static expected payoff at each time t to a small player i. In this sense, we call them a small
player who is strategically myopic even though they are long-lived. The following proposition
characterizes a sequentially rational public strategy profile.
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Proposition 3 (Proposition 3 in FS(2011)) A public strategy profile
{
(at , b¯t)
}
t≥0 is sequen-
tially rational with respect to a belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 if and only if there exist
{
βt
}
t≥0 in L
and a bounded process
{
Wt
}
t≥0 satisfying (6), such that for all t ≥ 0, and after all public
histories,
at ∈ argmax
a′∈A
g(a′, b¯t)+βt ·µ(a′, b¯t) (7)
bt ∈ argmax
b∈B
θ0,th(at ,b, b¯t)+
K
∑
i=1
θi,th(a∗i ,b, b¯t), ∀bt ∈ supp b¯t (8)
Finally, in continuous-time with multiple commitment types, FS(2011) characterize a se-
quential equilibrium as below:
Proposition 4 (Theorem 7 in FS(2011)) Fix the prior p ∈ ∆K−1. A public strategy profile{
(at , b¯t)
}
t≥0 and a belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 form a sequential equilibrium with continuation val-
ues
{
Wt
}
t≥0 for the normal type if and only if there exists a random process
{
βt
}
t≥0 inL such
that the following conditions hold:
(a)
{
θt
}
t≥0 satisfies equation (4) with initial condition θ0 = p.
(b)
{
Wt
}
t≥0 is a bounded process satisfying equation (6), given
{
βt
}
t≥0
(c)
{
(at , b¯t)
}
t≥0 satisfy the incentive constraint (7) and (8), given
{
βt
}
t≥0 and
{
θt
}
t≥0.
The following condition implies that the drift term in public signals by the normal type large
player cannot be represented by any convex combination of all drift terms from commitment
types’ action.
Condition 1 (FS(2011)) For each θt ∈ ∆K and each static Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(
at , b¯t
)
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of the game with prior p ∈ ∆K−1, we have:
µ(a, b¯) /∈ co
{
µ(a∗i , b¯)
∣∣ i ∈ {1, ...,K}}
With multiple commitment types, under Condition 1, FS(2011) show that the belief process
is believed to eventually converge to where the large player is a normal type from the perspective
of the normal type large player. In other words, in every public sequential equilibrium20,
P
{
lim
t→∞θ0,t = 1
}
= 1 under the normal type (9)
In a discrete-time setting, this impermanent reputation result is also shown by Cripps,
Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) and Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007).
20This is Theorem 8 in Faingold and Sannikov (2011).
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CHAPTER 2: EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE
COMMITMENT TYPES
In this chapter, we construct the optimal equation and the optimality condition when there
are multiple commitment types. With the optimal equation, we show that there exists a unique
equilibrium that is Markovian in the small players’ beliefs. The first step is to represent the
belief process from the perspective of the normal type large player. The following result is
easily derived from Proposition 1. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 For the equilibrium belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 and each k ∈ {0,1, ...,K},
dθk,t =
γk · γ0
θ0,t
dt+ γk ·dZnt (10)
where γk = γk(a∗t , b¯t ,θ) for each k ∈ {1, ...,K}, γ0 = γ0(at , b¯t ,θ) and Znt is a Brownian motion
from the perspective of the normal type large player given by:
dZnt = σ
−1(b¯t)
(
dXt−µ(at , b¯t)dt
)
In contrast to the set-up in FS(2011) that consider a single commitment type, when there
are multiple commitment types, we cannot guarantee that the drift term γk·γ0θ0 of each belief
process about type Tk is positive unless k = 0. This implies that the only possibility is that
θ 0 =
{
θ0,t
}
t≥0 is a supermartingale
21, while θ k =
{
θk,t
}
t≥0 for k 6= 0 is a submartingale only
when an angle between deviated drift terms from the weighted drift, µθt , of type Tk and the
normal type is greater than the acute. When the angle is larger than the acute, every component
of the deviated drift by type Tk is in the opposite direction to the deviated drift by the normal
21θ is a submartingale when θt ≤ E
[
θs
∣∣Ft] for t ≤ s. When θt ≥ E[θs ∣∣Ft], θ is called a supermartingale.
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type. Hence, the expected increment of belief about a type Tk is negative as time goes.22
Moreover, γk is the volatility of belief θ k, which can be understood as a speed of the be-
lief process about type k. The further the deviation from the weighted drift is, the higher the
volatility of belief about type Tk is. When small players believe that the drift of Tk is same as
the weighted drift, for the type Tk, γk = 0 and θ k does not change and remains at the level. In
this case, the type Tk is removed from the support of small players’ belief.
For the value function U(·) : ∆K−1 → R which is twice continuously differentiable and
Markovian in the small player’s belief θt about commitment types, let Wt =U(θt) where θt =(
θ1,t , ...,θK,t
)
, 0 < θk,t < 1, k ∈ {1, ...,K}, and ∑Kk=1θk,t + θ0,t = 1 for each time t ≥ 0. In
other words, the continuation value of the normal type large player following a given public
sequential strategy is Markovian in the small players’ belief θt . By using the Ito’s formula, we
can easily represent the following diffusion equation of the continuation payoff W to the normal
type large player. For θt =
(
θ1,t ,θ2,t , ...,θK,t
) ∈ ∆K−1,
dU(θt) =
{ K
∑
k=1
∂
∂θk,t
U(θt)
γ0 · γk
θ0,t
+
1
2
K
∑
j,k=1
∂ 2
∂θ j,tθk,t
U(θt)γ j · γk
}
dt+
K
∑
j=1
∂
∂θ j,t
U(θt)γ j ·dZnt ,
which is a second-order stochastic differential equation. By using the above equations and (6),
we can derive the optimality equation and the optimality condition that equilibrium Markov
payoff should satisfy.
Proposition 5 Let U(·) be a bounded function on ∆K−1, which is the solution of the following
second-order partial differential equation: for some r > 0,
22For example, suppose d = 1. In this case, µ ∈ R is a scalar. If µ0 = µ(a, b¯) of the normal type and µk =
µ(a∗k , b¯) of k-the commitment type lie in the same side from µ
θ , that is, either ”µ0 < µθ and µk < µθ ” or ”µ0 > µθ
and µk > µθ ”, then γk·γ0θ0 > 0. However,
γk·γ0
θ0
< 0 with µ0 and µ0 lying in the different sides from µθ , that is, either
”µk < µθ < µ0” or ”µ0 < µθ < µk”.
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1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi · γ jUθi,tθ j,t (θt)+
K
∑
i=1
γ0 · γi
θ0
Uθi,t (θt)− rU(θt) =−rg
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
(11)
where
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
is a public strategy at time t ≥ 0 that is consistent with the equilibrium
belief process θ .
Furthermore, this U(·) satisfies the following condition:
rβt = σ−1(b¯t)
K
∑
j=1
∂
∂θ j,t
U(θt)γ j (12)
where βt is given by Proposition 2.
Let’s say that the equation (11) is the optimality equation and the equation (12) is the opti-
mality condition. We can easily check that, when there is a single commitment type (K = 1),
the above optimality equation (11) and the optimality condition (12) are defined by:
1
2
γ1 · γ1Uθ1,tθ1,t (θt)+
γ0 · γ1
θ0
Uθ1,t (θt)− rU(θt) =−rg
(
a0,t(θt), b¯(θt)
)
rβt = σ−1(b¯t)
d
dθt
U(θt)γ1
Since θ0,t+θ1,t = 1 with K = 1, it is clear that Uθ1,t =−Uθ0,t , Uθ1,tθ1,t =Uθ0,tθ0,t , and γ1−γ0 =
θ1,t(1− θ0,t)σ−1(b¯)(µ1− µ0). Therefore, the above optimality partial differential equations
(11) and the optimality condition (12) with K = 1 is exactly same as the case in FS(2011).
In order to characterize the optimality equation (11), let Γ ≡ (γi · γ j)Ki, j=1 be the K ×K
matrix whose (i, j)-element is γi · γ j for each i, j ∈ {1, ...,K}. The following technical condition
is weaker than that µ0 is not included in the linear space generated by
{
µi
∣∣ i ∈ {1, ...,K}}.
Therefore, Condition 1 in FS(2011) does not imply Condition 2. Furthermore, we can check
that the following Condition 2 also does not imply Condition 1 when every µi is different from
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each other. When there is a single commitment type (K = 1), however, Condition 2 is exactly
same as Condition 1 in FS(2011).
Condition 2 For each belief process θ =
{
θt
}
t≥0 where θt ∈ ∆K−1, ∀t ∈ [0,∞) and each static
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (a, b¯) of the game with prior p = (θ1,0, ...,θK,0) ∈ ∆K−1,
K
∑
i=1
{ θ 2i,t
∑Ki=1θ 2i,t
−θi,t
}
µi 6= θ0,tµ0
When there is a single commitment type, Condition 2 means that µ1 6= µ023. Condition 2
is not so restrictive because if µ0 can not be represented as a linear combination of all µi for
i= 1, ...,K, then Condition 2 holds. Since we can generally construct µ j, j= 0,1, ...,K such that
µ0 is not a linear combination of all µi for i = 1, ...,K, Condition 2 is a general condition. First,
let d =K+1 and µ0 be a d-dimensional vector with first element of a> 0. For i= 1, ...,K, let µi
be a d-dimensional vector with first element of 0. Since d = K+1, we can pick µi, i = 1, ...,K
that are linearly independent. Since a > 0, µ0 can not be represented as a linear combination
of all µi for i = 1, ...,K. For such µ j, j = 0,1, ...,K, Condition 2 holds. Therefore, there are
uncountably many ways to construct such µ j for d = K+1. Since d is arbitrary, for any d > K,
we can construct such µ j, j = 0,1, ...,K satisfying Condition 2.
Lemma 1 explains why Condition 2 needs to be imposed on Γ to study the optimality equa-
tion (11). Nonetheless, it does not guarantee the uniform ellipticity of Γ on ∆K−1 because Γ
become degenerate on the boundary of ∆K−1.
Lemma 1 The K×K matrix Γ is a real symmetric, positive semi-definite with Γii =
∣∣γi∣∣2 ≥ 0.
Under the Condition 2, Γ is positive definite on ∆K−1.
This lemma implies that the optimality equation (11) is a second-order degenerate partial
23It can be easily shown that the set of θ ∈Rn satisfying both Condition 1 and Condition 2 is not empty.
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differential equation. Let M = ∆K−1 be the closure of ∆K−1 and
∂M =
{
θt ∈RK
∣∣ θ0,t = 0}∪{θi,t = 0 for some i ∈ {1, ...,K}}
be the boundary of M. Intuitively, the boundary of the belief space is the set of beliefs that small
players are certain that the large player is neither the normal type or a specific commitment
type. Under Condition 2, by Lemma 1, the optimality equation (11) is degenerate only on the
boundary.24
Denote the second order differential operator L : C(M)→C(M) which is corresponding to
the belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 defined by Corollary 1 where C(M) is the space of all continuous
functions defined on M. For θt ∈ ∆K−1 that follows the diffusion process (10), it is well-known
that: for f ∈C(M),
L f (θt) =
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi · γ j fθi,tθ j,t +
K
∑
i=1
γ0 · γi
θ0,t
fθi,t .
On a general open domain in RK , the elliptic operator L that is defined above is known as
the infinitesimal generator that is corresponding to a diffusion process that lives on the domain.
Even with Condition 2 on ∆K−1, however, since L might be degenerate on ∂M, we need to
classify each point on ∂M based on the criteria that if small players’ belief process θ is expected
to arrive at that point at some time. Freidlin (1985) define the fisrt category of points on ∂M.
Definition 5 (ε-regular point) A point θ ∗ ∈ ∂M is said to be ε-regular for the operator L (that
is, with corresponding process (θ ,Pθ )), in the domain ∆K−1, if for any ε > 0,
lim
θ∈∆K−1,θ→θ∗
Pθ
{
τ∆K > ε
}
= 0
24In other words, xTΓ(θt)x = 0 for and θt ∈ ∂M and ∀x 6= 0.
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where τ∆K−1 = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : θt /∈ ∆K−1
}
and Pθ is the solution to the Martingale problem corre-
sponding to the optimality equation (11) for any process θ .
When we say θ ∗ is a ε-regular point, it means that in any neighborhood of θ ∗, small players’
belief θ is certainly expected to arrive at θ ∗ immediately. Let ∂∆ε ⊂ ∂M be the set of all ε-
regular points included in ∂M. Following Friedman (1974), define a non-attainable set, which
is denoted by Ψ, as below.
Definition 6 (Non-attainable set) A set Ψ⊂ ∂M that is closed subset in RK , is said to be non-
attainable for the operator L (that is, with corresponding process
(
θ ,Pθ
)
), in the domain ∆K−1,
if for any consistent belief process θ ,
Pθ
{
θt ∈Ψ for some t > 0
}
= 0
A non-attainable set means that the belief process of small players is certainly not expected
to touch any point included in the set at any time. Therefore, from the view of normal type
large player, small players’ belief is not expected to arrive at the point in the non-attainable
set. Hence, we do not need to consider those points in the equilibrium from the perspective of
normal type large player. In the next proposition, we show that every point in the boundary ∂M
is included in the non-attainable set. In other words, there is no ε-regular point on ∂M.
Proposition 6 For any ε > 0 and prior p ∈ ∆K−1,
∂M =Ψ, and ∂∆ε = /0
with probability 1 from the perspective of the normal type large player.
This proposition separates the problem with multiple commitment types from the problem
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Figure 2: A belief trajectory when K = 2
with a single commitment type problem that was studied in FS(2011). It means that, from
the perspective of the normal type large player, the K-commitment types problem cannot be
even reduced to the (K− 1)-commitment types problem. Therefore, when there are multiple
commitment types, the normal type large player is almost sure that every commitment type and
normal type always have positive probability in the small players’ belief no matter how long
they observe public signals.
Figure 2 shows a belief trajectory of small players in ∆1 with the initial prior p when there
are only two commitment types, (K = 2). The belief process represented by a irregular line
lives only in the interior of ∆1 and does not touch any point on the boundary ∂∆1 because the
boundary is a non-attainable set. This implies that we could not directly deal with the multiple
commitment types problem using techniques in FS(2011) that was applied to the case of a single
commitment type. Instead, we should consider reputation games separately for each K-number
of commitment type(s), which is much different from reputation games in discrete time. Past
literature on reputation games has focused on the lower bound of the equilibrium payoff to the
normal type. Therefore, even when there are multiple commitment types, the normal type large
player could raise the lower bound by sending signals of the Stackelberg type. This result holds
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regardless of the number of commitment types as long as the Stackelberg type has a positive
probability in the small players’ prior. However, in continuous time reputation games, we are
focusing on the exact characterization of equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player
that is Markovian in small players’ belief. Since even a sufficiently small belief about some
commitment type might affect the equilibrium payoff, we could not ignore any belief when we
study the Markovian payoff in continuous time as long as it is positive.
We define the following correspondence that gives out sequential equilibrium strategy pro-
files for the given level of belief and the discount rate r > 0.
Definition 7 LetN : ∆K−1×R⇒ A×∆(B) be a correspondence defined by:
N (θt ,r) =
{
(at , b¯t) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯)+
(
σ(b¯) ·σ(b¯)T)−1 · zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B
K
∑
i=0
θih(ai,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
where zT = 1r
(
θ1,tUθ1,t , ...,θK,tUθK,t
)
.
In general, the correspondence N (·, ·) defined above is not continuous because we cannot
guarantee that it is lower-hemicontinuous. However, the following assumption makes every-
thing more easy.
Assumption 2 For each (θt ,r), the correspondence N is a singleton. Furthermore, for each
belief process θ =
{
θt
}
t≥0 with θt ∈∆K−1, the aggregate distribution b¯(θt) is a mass-distribution.
IfN (θt ,r) is upper-hemicontinuous, Assumption 2 guarantees theN (·, ·) is a continuous
function in (θ ,r). In other words, the equilibrium action profile
(
a(θ), b¯(θ)
)
is continuous in
(θ ,r). By applying the Maximum theorem, the following proposition is easily shown.
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Proposition 7 The correspondenceN (·, ·) is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemicon-
tinuous. Specifically, under Assumption 2,N (·, ·) is continuous in (θ ,r).
We show the equilibrium degeneracy in the continuous-time dynamic game with complete
information regardless of r > 0 as is shown in FS(2011) in the case of a single commitment
type. Therefore, the result of equilibrium degeneracy is invariant with respect to the number of
commitment types. From now on, denote Ur(θt) as the Markov equilibrium payoff at time t for
any fixed discount rate r > 0.
Proposition 8 Let θ ∗ = (0, ...,0) or (0, ...,0,1,0, ...,0) ∈ M where small players are certain
that the large player is a normal type or some commitment type Ti for any i ∈ {1, ...,K}. Then,
for any r > 0,
Ur(θ ∗) ∈ g
(
N (z∗,r)
)
where z∗ = 0 or
(
0, ...,0, 1r
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
∣∣
θi,t=1
,0, ...,0
)
for any i ∈ {1, ...,K}.
This proposition means that when there is no uncertainty about type of large player, the
equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player is determined by static payoff at the equilib-
rium action without any consideration of reputational incentive characterized by the value of z.
With z∗ = 0 or
(
0, ...,0, 1r
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
∣∣
θi,t=1
,0, ...,0
)
for any i ∈ {1, ...,K}, the reputational incentive
part,
(
σ(b¯) ·σ(b¯)T)−1 · zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯) is always zero.
Next, we show that there exists a unique Markov equilibrium payoff function that satisfies
the optimality equation (11) and the optimality condition (12). For any domain D ∈ RK , let
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W 2(D) be the Sobolev space25 of all Borel functions h : D→ R that are square integrable on
D. In other words, for any multi-index α and weak-derivatives Dα :
W 2(D) =
{
h : D→R
∣∣∣∣ ‖h‖W 2(D) < ∞}
where ‖h‖2
W 2(D) = ∑|α|≤2
∫
D |Dαh(x)|2ds. Denote W 2loc(D) be the space of all Borel functions
h : D→R that belong toW 2(D′) for any open subset D′ such that its closure D′ is also included
in D. The following theorem is our first main result, which is an extension of Theorem 4 in
Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to the case of multiple commitment types.
Theorem 1 Under Condition 2 and Assumption 2, for any given discount rate r > 0, there
exists a unique Markov equilibrium payoff function Ur(·) defined on the space of belief process,
M, satisfying the optimality equation:
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi · γ j(Ur)θi,tθ j,t (θt)+
K
∑
i=1
γ0 · γi
θ0,t
(Ur)θi,t (θt)− rUr(θt) =−rg
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
(13)
where
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
) ∈N (θt ,r)26 is a public strategy at time t ≥ 0 and Ur(θt) =Wt .
Furthermore, for any static payoff function g(·, ·) that is continuous on M27, the equilibrium
payoff Ur(·) that is the solution to the equation (13) is also continuous on M and belongs to
W 2loc(∆
K−1).
The main difference from the case of a single commitment type that is studied in FS(2011)
is the characterization of equilibrium payoff, Ur(θt), when θt is on the boundary of ∆K−1. In
the case of a single commitment type, the equilibrium payoff converges to the static payoff as
small players’ belief converges to the boundary where the large player is certainly believed as
25In the Sobolev space, the derivative is defined in the sense of distributions.
26This implies that Ur also satisfies the optimality condition (12).
27SinceN is continuous under Assumption 2, this holds with g(·, ·) that is continuous in (a, b¯).
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either the normal type or the commitment type. This is because the boundary in the case of a
single commitment type is where small players are certain about the large player’s type. On
the other hand, on the boundary of ∆K−1 with multiple commitment types, small players are
only sure that the large player is not a specific commitment type. Hence, it is ambiguous to
determine what the equilibrium payoff is for such a belief at which other commitment types are
still possible. Furthermore, it is generally required to define the equilibrium payoff function on
every boundary to determine a solution to a partial differential equation.
Fortunately, by Proposition 6, every boundary point is included in a non-attainable set,
which make our problem to show the existence of equilibrium payoff tractable. Although we
do not know the value of equilibrium payoff on the whole boundary, we are certain that there
is a Markov equilibrium payoff that is characterized as the unique solution to the optimality
equation and the optimality condition.
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CHAPTER 3: STOCHASTIC REPRESENTATION OF
MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFF
Although we show that there is a unique Markov equilibrium with multiple commitment
types, Theorem 1 does not give any information about a specific form of Markov equilibrium
payoff function. It just shows an existence of the equilibrium payoff. Proposition 6 implies that,
in small players’ belief, every commitment type has positive probability even after observing
sufficiently long history, which means that there is no need to consider boundary values of
equilibrium payoff. This is the “punch-line” to show a unique existence of Markov equilibrium
payoff.
However, according to Proposition 8, we already know that the equilibrium payoff should
be determined as the value of static payoff at all vertices of the belief space, M, where small
players absolutely believe that the large player is either some specific commitment type or
the normal type. By using this degeneracy of equilibrium, we can impose some regularity
restrictions on the equilibrium payoff. In this section, we find a stochastic representation28 of
the Markov equilibrium payoff. This kind of representation has not been shown yet in past
literature on reputation games even in a continuous-time set-up. Moreover, it is well-known
that we can solve numerically the optimality equation when the solution is represented by this
kind of expression. Hence, from an applied perspective, Theorem 2 opens the way to calculate
values of the Markov equilibrium payoffs in a specific reputation game by using Monte Carlo
methods.
First, instead of the original problem, we consider a reduced problem on a restricted belief
domain. For each sufficiently small δ > 0, construct Dδ ⊂ ∆K−1 that is a convex and connected
28We adopt the expression of “stochastic representation” by following Feehan and Pop (2015)
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Figure 3: A construction of Dδ when K = 2
open subset with boundary29 ∂Dδ = ∂Dδ 30 such that
(a) ∪δ>0 Dδ = ∆K−1 and Dδ1 ⊂ Dδ2 for any δ1 > δ2
(b) ∂Dδ
∣∣
Ωδ
= ∂M
∣∣
Ωδ
(c) ∂Dδ\Ωδ ⊂ ∪i∈{0,1,..,K}
{
θi > 1−δ
}
where Ωδ is a subset of ∂M such that δ < θi < 1− δ for some i ∈ {0,1, ...,K} and θ j = 0
for some j 6= i. In the construction of Dδ , (a) means that {Dδ} is an increasing sequence of
restricted domains converging to ∆K−1 as δ goes to 0. (b) implies that Dδ shares Ωδ with
∆K−1 as a part of their boundary. Finally, (c) means that the remaining part of boundary of
Dδ except for Ωδ is where some specific commitment type has sufficiently high probability in
small players’ belief.
Figure 3 describes a construction of Dδ when there are only 2 commitment types. The
dashed line represents Ωδ which is included in ∂M where belief process are not expected to
29Actually, it is enough to find Dδ having some part of C3-boundary in ∂Dδ .
30Here, the boundary of an open set is defined as the boundary of the closure.
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touch. The dashed curves correspond to ∂Dδ\Ωδ . These curves make up the boundary of Dδ
where some commitment type has sufficiently high probability in small players’ belief because
they are included in the δ -neighborhood from a vertex of ∆K−1. The following lemma shows
that these parts of boundary represented by blue dashed curves are included in a set of ε-regular
points where we should impose some boundary condition.
Lemma 2 Under Condition 2, for any sufficiently small δ ∈ (0,1), Ωδ is an non-attainable set
and ∂Dδ\Ωδ is a set of ε-regular points in ∂Dδ .
By Lemma 2, for any δ ∈ (0,1), Ωδ is still a non-attainable set that is included in the
boundary of ∆K−1. However, ∂Dδ\Ωδ is included in the neighborhoods of each vertex of ∆K−1
where belief process is expected to touch immediately. Denote ∂∆εδ = ∂D
δ\Ωδ , which is the
ε-regular part of ∂Dδ , where, because of the equilibrium degeneracy at the vertices of M shown
by Proposition 8, we expect equilibrium payoff is sufficiently close to the static payoff. For
each δ > 0 and any given r > 0, we consider the following reduced problem on the restricted
domain Dδ :
LUδ (θt)− rUδ (θt) =−rg
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
on Dδ
Uδ (θt) = g
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
on ∂∆εδ
Figure 4 depicts a reduced problem on the restricted domain when there are two commitment
types. The dashed curves represent ∂∆εδ where we should impose boundary conditions. Since
those parts are included in δ -neighborhood from some vertex of ∆K−1, it is reasonable to impose
the large player’s static payoff g(·, ·) on the parts for small enough δ . Let Uδ (θ) be the solution
to the above second-order partial differential equation defined on the restricted domain Dδ . This
is the equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player that is Markovian in small players’
belief θ ∈ Dδ when we restrict small players’ belief space to Dδ instead of ∆K−1. Let τδ =
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Figure 4: An reduced problem when K = 2
inf
{
t > 0
∣∣ θt /∈Dδ} be the first hitting time when small players’ belief arrives at some boundary
of Dδ . Since Ωδ is included in a non-attainable set, we certainly expect that, at τδ , small
players’ belief process θτδ would touch some ε-regular point that is included in ∂∆
ε
δ .
Proposition 9 Under the Condition 2 and Assumption 2, when we restrict on Dδ for some
δ ∈ (0,1), there exist a unique Markov equilibrium payoff Uδ (θ) that satisfies the optimality
equation (11), which is bounded, measurable and continuous almost everywhere on Dδ . The
payoff Uδ (θ) has the following form: for any θ ∈ Dδ and 0 < r < ∞,
Uδ (θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}
]
+ rEθ
∫ τδ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds (14)
Furthermore, the equilibrium payoff satisfies the following boundary conditions near each ver-
tex of ∆K−1 : for any θτδ ∈ ∂∆εδ ,
Uδ (θτδ ) = g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
Proposition 9 provides a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoff when
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we are restricted to the small belief domain Dδ for some sufficiently small δ ∈ (0,1). This
representation looks similar to the Feynman-Kac representation of the solution to a second-
order parabolic partial differential equation. In order to derive the same form of representation
of the equilibrium payoff on the original belief space, we need to find, for each θ , the limit
of
{
Uδ (θ)
}
, each of which is given by (14), when δ goes to zero. For this purpose, pick a
decreasing sequence
{
δi
}
i∈N such that limi→∞ δi = 0. Corresponding to the sequence
{
δi
}
i∈N,
construct an increasing sequence of restricted domains {Dδi}i∈N that is convergent to ∆K−1
and each Dδi satisfies above (a), (b), and (c). Let τ = limi→∞ τδi be the limit of a sequence
of corresponding hitting times. Since limi→∞Dδi = ∆K−1 and θt is a continuous process with
probability 1, it is trivial that τ = τ∆K−1 =
{
t ≥ 0 : θt /∈ ∆K−1
}
. Let V (A) be the set of all
vertices of A. The following theorem shows the stochastic representation of Markov equilibrium
payoff of the original problem.
Theorem 2 Under Condition 1, 2, and Assumption 2, there exists a unique Markov equilibrium
payoff function U(·) that is an approximate31 solution to the optimality equation (12) on ∆K−1.
This is a bounded and measurable function on ∆K−1 with the following boundary condition at
all the vertices of ∆K−1: for any θ ∗ ∈ V (∆K−1),
lim
θ→θ∗
U(θ) = g
(
a(θ ∗), b¯(θ ∗)
)
Furthermore, the Markov equilibrium payoff U(θ) is given by: for any given θ ∈ ∆K−1 and
0 < r < ∞,
U(θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
exp{−rτ}
]
+ rEθ
∫ τ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds (15)
31Actually, this is an approximate equilibrium payoff on ∆K−1 because it is a pointwise limit of {Uδi(θ)} for
each θ as i→ ∞. Each Uδi in the sequence is defined for θ ∈ Dδi .
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Sketch of Proof. For each given δi > 0, consider Dδi where a belief trajectory lives on.
While we could not assign any boundary condition on ∂M, by Lemma 2, each ∂Dδi has the
ε-regular boundaries that is near of each vertex of ∆K−1. Only on those regular boundaries, we
could assign boundary values that equilibrium payoff should satisfy. Since Dδi\Ωδi is included
in where some of commitment type has sufficiently high probability that is greater than 1−
δi, it is reasonable to expect that the equilibrium values at those point are included in some
neighborhood of the value of static payoff by the degeneracy result shown by Proposition 8.
With this boundary condition on ∂∆εδ , we could apply the Dynkin’s formula to the second-order
partial differential equation. The result is shown by Proposition 9.32 Finally, we show that,
when the sequence
{
δi
}
converges to zero, the sequence of equilibrium payoffs
{
Uδi(θ)
}
on the
reduced domain Dδi has a pointwise limit for each θ ∈ Dδi . Since the belief trajectory {θt}t≥0
is continuous in probability 1, the sequence of stopping times
{
τδi
}
when the belief touch the ε-
regular boundary Dδi\Ωδi is an increasing sequence in decreasing
{
δi
}
. Furthermore, Condition
1 guarantees that the belief process is certainly expected to touch this regular boundary for any
prior, which means that both term of equilibrium payoff in (14) on the reduced domain Dδi
are expectations of uniformly integrable random variables. Therefore, for each θ ∈ Dδi , the
sequence of equilibrium payoffs on reduced domains has a pointwise limit as δi → 0. This
pointwise limit approximates the equilibrium payoff on the whole belief space ∆K−1. Hence,
this limit is a stochastic representation of Markov equilibrium payoff on ∆K−1 with multiple
commitment types. 
In past literature on reputation games, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no result
about a representation of equilibrium payoff. Even in FS(2011) with a single commitment
type, only the characterization of ordinary differential equation and the optimality condition
that Markov equilibrium payoff should satisfy were provided without any mention about forms
32This is also guaranteed by Theorem 5.2 in Stroock and Varadhan (1972). It is well-known that, when we
deal with a degenerate partial differential equation, the boundary condition should be assigned only on parts of
boundary that is regular in a strong sense.
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of the equilibrium payoff. Therefore, this stochastic representation in Theorem 2, which is
derived via Feynman-Kac type formula, sheds light on the application of reputation games into
more real world problem. By applying Monte Carlo methods to the representation, it is already
well-known that we can calculate the equilibrium payoff function numerically. Therefore, in a
specific example, it is possible to evaluate the value of equilibrium utilities of normal type large
player with respect to the reputation of small players.
3.1. When d = 1 and K = 1
In this subchapter, suppose that d = 1 and there is a single commitment type (K = 1). Hence,
the drift term µi, the diffusion term γi, and σ(b¯) are scalar-valued. Moreover, the public signals{
Xt
}
t≥0 are one-dimensional diffusion process. When we restrict on D
δ =
{
θ1 ∈ (δ ,1− δ )
}
for some δ > 0, without loss of generality, we can assume that δ < θ0,t < 1− δ for all t ≥ 0
because Dδ is away from every vertex of ∆0 by some distance that is characterized by δ and
θ0,t +θ1,t = 1 for each t ≥ 0. Denote Iδ = (δ ,1− δ ) be the space of beliefs about the normal
type large player. Let Tδ = inf
{
t > 0
∣∣ θ0,t = δ} and T1−δ = inf{t > 0 ∣∣ θ0,t = 1− δ} be the
first hitting times for each boundary point of Iδ . Define τδ = Tδ ∧T1−δ is the first hitting time
when θt arrived at any boundary of Iδ . The following proposition show that, for each δ ∈ (0,1),
the belief about the normal type large player is certainly expected to touch θ0,τ = δ first before
it arrives at 1−δ .
Proposition 10 Under Condition 2, for any prior θ0 ∈ Iδ ,
lim
δ→0
Pθ0
{
inf
0≤t<τδ
θ0,t > δ
}
= lim
δ→0
Pθ0
{
θ0,τδ = 1−δ
}
= 1
from the perspective of the normal type large player.
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This result is similar to the conclusion (9) that is shown by FS(2011) under Condition 1.
However, Proposition 10 is a more strong result in the sense that it shows that the first exit time
of θ0,t in Iδ always take place where θ0,t is sufficiently close to 1 before it arrives at some point
where θ0,t is sufficiently small. With this conclusion, we further characterize the stochastic
representation shown by Theorem 2 when d = 1 and K = 1.
Corollary 2 Assume that d = 1 and there is a single commitment type. Under Condition 1, 2,
and Assumption 2, the equilibrium Markov payoff is given by: for any given θ ∈ ∆0,
U(θ) = g(a∗, b¯∗)Eθ
[
exp{−rτ}]+ rEθ ∫ τ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds (16)
where
(a∗, b¯∗) ∈
{
(a, b¯) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯), and b ∈ argmaxb′∈Bh(a,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
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CHAPTER 4: A FAIL OF REPUTATION EFFECTS AT
THE BEHAVIORAL LEVEL
Past literature on reputation games has shown that the normal type large player’s equilibrium
payoff converges to the Stackelberg payoff by choosing the corresponding Stackelberg action
as the large player becomes sufficiently patient. FS(2011) show a similar result at the behav-
ioral level that the normal type’s equilibrium action also converges to the Stackelberg action as
the discount rate goes to zero.33 In this chapter, we show that although large player becomes
sufficiently patient, the normal type’s equilibrium action need not converge to an action of any
commitment type when the prior is given at some specific level. First, we introduce the follow-
ing condition under which the normal type’s equilibrium action converges to some point in the
sub-manifold generated by every commitment type’s fixed action.
Condition 3 For any prior p ∈ ∆K−1, an equilibrium strategy {a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)}t≥0, and a con-
sistent belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 that is corresponding to
{
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)
}
t≥0:
(a) There exists a C1 > 0 such that
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
>C1 for every i ∈ {1, ...,K}.
(b) There exists a C2 > 0 such that
∣∣µ(a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt))−µθt (θt)∣∣≥C2∣∣∣∣a0,t(θt)− K∑
i=1
θi,ta∗i (θt)−θ0,ta0,t(θt)
∣∣∣∣
Condition 3(a) implies every commitment type is a “good” type. In other words, the normal
type large player’s equilibrium payoff increases with respect to the belief about any commitment
type. Hence, reputation about any commitment type has positive value to the normal type large
33In this case, the commitment type should be the Stackelberg type. Because small players are uncertain
about payoff-related types about the large player, it is unnatural to assume that small players recognize the exact
Stackelberg action of the large player as the only commitment type.
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player. If the static payoff function g(θt) = g
(
at(θ), b¯t(θ)
)
has this property, then Condition
3(a) also holds. Condition 3(b) means that if the normal type’s equilibrium action is different
from the weighted average of actions chosen by every types, then the drift term from the normal
type and the average of drift terms by every types are also different. When the drift term of
public signals, µ
(
at(θt), b¯t(θt)
)
, is quasi-linear in the action profile a(θ), then Condition 3(b)
is also satisfied under the following condition:
Condition 4 34 For any prior p ∈ ∆K−1, an equilibrium strategy {a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)}t≥0, and a
consistent belief process
{
θt
}
t≥0 corresponding to
{
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)
}
t≥0:
(b)* There exists a C2 > 0 such that
∣∣µ(a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt))−µ(a′(θt), b¯t(θt))∣∣≥C2∣∣a0,t(θt)−a′(θt)∣∣
Condition 4 implies that different actions chosen by large player are expected to have differ-
ent effects on public signals from the view of the normal type. Under Condition 3, we show that
the normal type’s equilibrium action converges to a convex combination of actions of all com-
mitment type’s as discount rate goes to zero. When there is a single commitment type (K = 1),
this result is consistent with Theorem 5 in FS(2011).
Proposition 11 Under Condition 2 and 3, and Assumption 2, for any given belief θt , the equi-
librium action of the normal type large player converges to a convex combination of every
commitment type’s action as the large player becomes sufficiently patient. In other words, as
r→ 0,
a0,t(θt) −→
K
∑
i=1
θi,t
1−θ0,t a
∗
i
34This condition is same as Condition 3(a) in Faingold and Sannikov (2011).
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Figure 5: Convergence when K = 3
Denote A∗(θt) =∑Ki=1
θi,t
1−θ0,t a
∗
i be the limit action that is a convex combination of every com-
mitment type’s action for any given θt ∈ ∆K−1. Proposition 11 implies that a0,t(θt) converges
to A∗(θt) as r goes to 0. Therefore, the normal type’s equilibrium action might converge to any
commitment type Ti’s action when the belief process converges to where θi,t = 1 after observing
enough history. In FS(2011), because there is a single commitment type, the sub-manifold gen-
erated by the commitment type’s action is a singleton. Therefore, the normal type large player’s
equilibrium action always converges to the commitment type’s action as the large player be-
comes patient. Figure 5 describes the result of Proposition 11 when there are 3 commitment
types.
However, under the following condition, with multiple commitment types, this limit action
stays away from any commitment type action because the equilibrium belief process is trapped
in some specific area in the belief space. This is a main difference between the case of a single
commitment type and the case of multiple commitment types.
Condition 5 For each i ∈ {1, ...,K}, there exists only one βi ∈ (0,1) such that:
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Figure 6: Condition 5 when K = 2
(a) 0 < ∑Ki=1βi < 1
(b) µ
(
a∗i (θ
βi
t ), b¯t(θ
βi
t )
)
= ∑Kj 6=i
θ j,t
1−βiµ
(
a∗j(θ
βi
t ), b¯t(θ
βi
t )
)
+
θ0,t
1−βiµ
(
a0,t(θ
βi
t ), b¯(θ
βi
t )
)
for any θβit =
(
θ1,t , ...,θi−1,t ,βi,θi+1,t , ...,θK,t
) ∈ ∆K−1 with ∑Kj 6=iθ j,t +θ0,t = 1−βi.
Condition 5(a) guarantees that the belief β lies in ∆K−1. At the belief β =
(
β1, ...,βK
) ∈
∆K−1, Condition 5(b) implies that µ
(
a0,t(β ), b¯t(β )
)
= µ
(
a∗1(β ), b¯t(β )
)
= · · · = µ(a∗K(β ), b¯t(β )).
In other words, all drift terms in public signals by every commitment type and the normal type
are same at the belief β ∈ ∆K−1. If all drift terms in public signals are same across all the com-
mitment types and the normal type, then Condition 5(b) also holds and the posterior remains as
same as the prior no matter how long small players observe public signals. Condition 5 is not
necessary but a sufficient condition for Theorem 3.35
Under the following condition, at θβit 6= β , Condition 5(b) does not imply that all drift terms
in public signals are same. This is possible because each drift term from a commitment type is
affected by the aggregate distribution of small players’ actions as well as a commitment action,
which are also dependent on the level of small players’ belief.
35We can find other conditions that are sufficient for Theorem 3 to hold by characterizing an invariant set where
the belief process lives in different ways.
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Condition 6 Let θβit 6= β . For each i, j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}, there exist C3 > 0 such that:
∣∣µ(a∗i (θβit ), b¯t(θβit ))−µ(a∗j(θβit ), b¯t(θβit ))∣∣≥C3∣∣a∗i (θβit )−a∗j(θβit )∣∣
where a∗0
(
θβit
)
= a0
(
θβit
)
is the normal type large player’s equilibrium action at the belief θβit .
Figure 6 describes the effects of Condition 5 on the equilibrium belief process when there are
two commitment types. Since each βi plays a role of a barrier on the equilibrium belief about
each commitment type Ti, even after observing long enough public signals, the equilibrium
belief trajectory, which is represented by blue irregular line, is trapped in the gray area. This
gray area is an invariant set. In other words, the posterior of small players with prior in the area
keeps staying in the area with probability 1. Note that Condition 5(b) only requires that for each
commitment type, there is only one level of belief 0 < βi < 1. Therefore, we do not require that
on the whole belief space, every drift term should be represented by convex combinations of
drift terms by other types. Let F˙ =
{
θt ∈ ∆K−1
∣∣ βi < θi,t < 1 for every i ∈ {1, ...,K}} be an
open subset in ∆K−1, which is characterized by β ∈ ∆K−1.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Condition 2 holds for θt ∈ F˙ . Under Condition 3 and 5 in F˙, the limit
action is uniformly away from each commitment action. In other words, there exists a α > 0
such that
∣∣A∗(θt)−a∗i ∣∣≥ α
for any i ∈ {1, ...,K},
Sketch of Proof. By Proposition 11, we know that, for any θt , the limit action A∗(θt) is in
the sub-manifold generated by
{
a∗1, ...,a
∗
K
}
. By Condition 5, we set up a barrier to each θi,t that
prevents θi,t from decreasing below βi. Since F˙ is an invariant set, there is also a unique Markov
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Figure 7: Convergence when K = 3
equilibrium payoff, UF˙(θ), when we restrict the original problem on F˙ . Therefore, with a prior
in F˙ , the equilibrium belief process is certainly believed to live in F˙ . With Condition 3 imposed
on this UF˙ , the limit action A
∗(θt) for θt ∈ F˙ stays away from every vertex of ∆K−1 
Theorem 3 means that although the large player becomes patient enough, the normal type’s
equilibrium action is always different from any commitment action by some non-trivial distance.
Therefore, reputation effects do not hold in this case at the behavioral level. In other words,
large player could not fix his equilibrium payoff at the level of the Stackelberg payoff in spite
that one of the multiple commitment types is the Stackelberg type. Figure 7 describes Theorem
3 when there are 3 commitment types. Each commitment type’s action consists of vertex of a
tetrahedron. The gray area represents the invariant set F that is characterized by Condition 5.
When the prior about commitment types lives in this gray area, then the equilibrium posterior
also lives in this area. Therefore, the normal type large player’s equilibrium action a0 converges
to some point in the gray area, which is away from every vertex of ∆K−1.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
We study a continuous-time reputation game when there are multiple commitment types.
Theorem 1 shows that there exists a unique equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player
that is Markovian in small players’ beliefs. In Theorem 2, we find a stochastic representation of
the equilibrium payoff. Theorem 3 provides an example that, under some conditions on public
signals, the equilibrium action of the normal type does not converge to any commitment type
action even though the large player is sufficiently patient. In other words, reputation effects do
not hold. Although we focus only on the reputation games, these results we have derived could
be easily adjusted to more general continuous-time games that study a Markov equilibrium
payoff with respect to belief processes.
Although this is a partial extension of FS(2011) by allowing multiple commitment types,
there is still an open question about what if the best response correspondenceN (θ ,r) is not a
singleton. WhenN (θ ,r) is a singleton as we assume in this paper, it is a continuous function
in (θ ,r). However, when N (θ ,r) yields multiple equilibrium action profiles for each given
(θ ,r), it is no longer guaranteed to be lower-hemicontinuous. Hence, we are not sure that equi-
librium action profiles
(
a(θ), b¯(θ)
)∈N (θ ,r) is continuous in (θ ,r). FS(2011) deal with such
a case by using the techniques in differential inclusions and the concept of viscosity solutions36
when there is a single commitment type. With multiple commitment types, it might be more
technically difficult to show the existence of the Markov equilibrium payoff function. However,
one possible approach to the difficulty is an imposing a condition on a setN (θ ,r) under which
each player choose an action among all best responses. We leave this open question as a future
research.
Furthermore, we assume that the large player acts against a continuum of opponents. There-
36This is a kind of solution to a differential equation in a more generalized sense because it may be assumed to
be non-differentiable. For an introduction to concepts and related properties of viscosity solutions, see Crandall,
Ishii, and Lions (1992).
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fore, although the opponents are long-lived players with a same discount rate as the large player,
each of them do not have any power on the progress of the game. In this sense, we call the op-
ponents small compared to the large player who can affect the public signals by himself. This
implies that each small player plays myopically as is living only once. However, when there
are finite number of opponents who are against the large player, things are absolutely different.
Each of the opponents is no longer a small player because their choice could change the game
through affecting public signals directly. We expect that, in this case, the reputation effects are
hard to hold relative to the case of small players. Although there has been lots of literature on
reputation games with non-myopic opponent players, it is also an interesting future research
question to study whether the result of reputation games with finite number of opponents con-
verges to the result of games with a continuum of small players when the number of opponents
increases.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. First, by the definition of µθt (at , b¯t),
dXt−µθt (at , b¯t)dt =
{
dXt−µ(at , b¯t)dt
}
+
{
µ(at , b¯t)−µθt (at , b¯t)
}
dt
Since dZnt = σ−1(b¯t)
(
dXt−µ(at , b¯t)dt
)
, for each k ∈ {1, ...,K},
γk(at , b¯t ,θt) ·σ−1(b¯t)
(
dXt−µ(at , b¯t)dt
)
= γk(at , b¯t ,θt) ·dZnt (17)
Furthermore, since γ0(at , b¯t ,θt) = θ0σ−1(b¯t)
(
µ(at , b¯t)−µθt (at , b¯t)
)
,
σ−1(b¯t)
{
µ(at , b¯t)−µθ (at , b¯t)
}
dt =
γ0(at , b¯t ,θt)
θ0
dt (18)
Therefore,
γk(at , b¯t ,θt) ·σ−1(b¯t)
{
µ(at , b¯t)−µθt (at , b¯t)
}
dt =
γk(at , b¯t ,θt) · γ0(at , b¯t ,θt)
θ0
dt (19)
By (18) and (20),
dθk,t =
γk · γ0
x0
dt+ γk ·dZnt
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. By the definition of U(θt) =Wt , dU(θt) = dW . From the drift terms,
r
(
U(θt)−g(ao, b¯)
)
=
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi · γ j ∂
2U(θt)
∂θi,t∂θ j,t
+
K
∑
i=1
γ0 · γi
θ0,t
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
, hence the optimality equation is derived. From the dispersion terms,
rβt = σ−1(b¯t)
K
∑
j=1
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
γ j.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let θt = (θ1,t ,θ2,t , ...,θK,t) ∈ ∆K−1 and Γ= (Γi j) = (γi · γ j) be a K×K matrix.
θTt ·Γ ·θt = θTt

γ1 · γ1 γ1 · γ2 · · · γ1 · γK
γ2 · γ1 γ2 · γ2 · · · γ2 · γK
...
... . . .
...
γK · γ1 γK · γ2 · · · γK · γK


θ1,t
θ2,t
...
θK,t

= (θ1,t ,θ2,t , ...,θK,t)

γ1 ·∑i=1 γiθi,t
γ2 ·∑i=1 γiθi,t
...
γK ·∑i=1 γiθi,t

= θt ·

γ1 ·∏
γ2 ·∏
...
γK ·∏

= θ1,tγ1 ·∏+ · · ·+θK,tγK ·∏
=∏ ·∏≥ 0
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where ∏= ∑Ki=1 γiθi,t .
Furthermore, when µθt = µ0,
K
∑
i=1
γi =
K
∑
k=1
θk,tµ(a∗k , b¯)−
K
∑
k=1
θk,tµθt
= σ−1(b¯)
(
µθt −θ0,tµ0−µθt (1−θ0,t)
)
= σ−1(b¯)θ0,t
(
µθt −µ0
)
= 0
, which implies that∏= 0 with θt =
(1−θ0,t
K , ...,
1−θ0,t
K
)∈∆K−1 because θ0,tµ0+ 1−θ0,tK ∑Kk=1 µk =
µ0, that is, 1K ∑
K
k=1 µk = µ0. Therefore
(1−θ0,t
K , ...,
1−θ0,t
K
) ·Γ · (1−θ0,tK , ..., 1−θ0,tK ) = ∏2 ≥ 0 and
hence Γ is a positive semi-definite matrix.
By the definition of γi,
K
∑
i=1
θi,tγi =
K
∑
i=1
θ 2i,t
µi−µθt
σ
=
1
σ
{ K
∑
i=1
θ 2i,tµi−µθt
K
∑
i=1
θ 2i,t
}
= 0
⇔
K
∑
i=1
θ 2i,tµi = µ
θt
K
∑
i=1
θ 2i,t
⇔
K
∑
i=1
{ θ 2i,t
∑Ki=1θ 2i,t
−θi,t
}
µi = θ0,tµ0
Define Ai = 1θ0,t
{
θ2i,t
∑Ki=1 θ2i,t
−θi,t
}
. Since ∑Ki=1 Ai =
1
θ0,t
(
1−∑Ki=1θi,t
)
= 1θ0,t
{
1− (1−θ0,t)
}
= 1,
∏= 0 is implied by that µ0 is represented by a linear combination of {µ1, ...,µK} with weight
of
{
A1, ...,AK
}
.
We can check that A1 < 0 when θ0 = 15 ,θ1 =
1
10 ,θ2 =
1
2 ,θ3 =
1
5 , and θ j = 0 for j ≥ 4.
Therefore, θTt ·Γ ·θt =∏ ·∏> 0 under the Condition 2, which implies that Γ is positive definite
in ∆K−1.
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Proof of Proposition 6
It is enough to show that M = ∆K−1 ∪ ∂M is invariant, which is defined below, for the
diffusion process
{
θt
}
t≥0 with a prior p ∈ ∆K−1:
Definition 8 We say a set M ∈Rn is invariant for the diffusion process {Xxt }t≥0 if and only if
X0 = x ∈M implies Xxt ∈M, Px−a.s. for all t ≥ 0
Let M = ∆K−1. Since M is a compact set with a piecewise smooth boundary, to show the
invariance of S, we follow Cannarsa, Da Prato, and Frankowska (2010)37. Denote Mi =
{
x ∈
RK : xi ≥ 0
}
for some i ∈ {1, ...,K} and M0 =
{
x ∈ RK : ∑Ki=1 xi ≤ 1
}
. It is trivial that every
M j for j ∈ {0,1, ...,K} is a closed set of class C2,1.38 Each M j is where, from the view of the
normal type, small players certainly believe that the large player is not the type Tj. For any
K ∈N, we can represent the belief space with an intersection of closed domain as below:
M = ∆K−1 = ∩Kj=0M j
Let d∂M j(θ) be the Euclidean distant to M j from θ ∈ RK . The oriented distance function
δM j(θ) to M j from θ ∈RK is defined as below:
δM j(θ) =
 d∂M j(θ), if x ∈M j;−d∂M j(θ), if x ∈Mcj .
37See Theorem 3.2. in Cannarsa, Da Prato, and Frankowska (2010)
38In other words, it is a closed connected subset such that, for all point x ∈M j, there exist r > 0 and a function
φ : B(x,r)→R which is twice differentiable on B(x,r) with bounded Lipschitz second derivatives such that ∂M j∩
B(x,r) =
{
y∈ B(x,r) : φ(y) = 0}. For each M j, ∂M j is a (K−1)-dimensional hyperplane in K-dimensional space,
it can be represented with a linear function φ j. Therefore, for each j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}, ∂M j is smooth.
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By the definition, it is also clear that ∇δM j(θ) = −νM j(θ¯) where νM j(θ¯) is the outward
normal to M j at θ¯ ∈ ∂M j such that δM j(θ) =
∣∣θ − θ¯ ∣∣. For each j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}, let N jε ={
x ∈ RK : ∣∣δM j∣∣ < ε}. Then, since every boundary of M is included in a hyperplane that is
belong to some M j, for any j, there exists ε1 > 0 such that
proj∂M j(θ) ∈ ∂M
for all θ ∈ ∆K−1∩Mε1j where proj∂M j(θ) is the projection of θ to ∂M j.
Fix i ∈ {1, ...,K}. For any θ ∈ ∆K−1, the distant function to Mi from θ ∈ ∆K−1 is defined
by δMi(θ) = θi. Therefore, on ∂Mi ∩M, the outward normal vector, ν is defined as νT =
(ν1, ...,νi, ...,νK) = (0, ...,0,1,0, ...,0) = ∇δMi(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂Mi . For j = 0, the outward normal vector
νT = (1, ...,1) = ∇δM0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂M0 . Therefore, for each j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}, 0 6= ∇δM0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂M j
Every θ ∈ ∂M belongs to ∂M j for at most one j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}. Fix k ∈ {1, ...,K}. For such
a θ ∈ ∂Mk, γk(θ) = 0 because θk = 0. Therefore,
〈
Γ∇δMk(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂Mk , ∇δMk(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂Mk
〉
=
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)νki (θ)ν
k
j (θ) = γ
2
k (θ) = 0.
where
〈·, ·〉 is the inner product defined on RK ×RK and νk is the outward normal to ∂Mk at
θ . Furthermore, for θ ∈ ∂Mi,
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)
∂ 2δMk(θ)
∂θi∂θ j
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Mk
+
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δMk(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Mk
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δMk(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Mk
=
γk(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
= 0.
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For j = 0 and θ ∈ ∂M0,
〈
Γ∇δM0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂M0 , ∇δM0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂M0
〉
=
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)ν0i (θ)ν
0
j (θ)
=
{ K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)
}2
= γ0(θ)2 = 0
because γ0(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ ∂M0. In the similar way,
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)
∂ 2δM0(θ)
∂θi∂θ j
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂M0
+
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δM0(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂M0
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δM0(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂M0
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
= 0.
Therefore, M is an inaccessible set. Since ∂M=∪Ki=0
{
∂Mi∩M
}
, we conclude that ∂∆K−1 =
Ψ is a non-attainable set and the ε-regular boundary set ∂∆ε = /0 is empty.
Proof of Proposition 7
We use the Berg’s Maximum theorem. First, note that both A and B are compact sets. Under
Assumption 2, b¯ ∈ ∆(B) is mass-distribution39, ∆(B) is also a compact set. Note the definition
39In other words, it is centered on each b ∈ B.
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ofN (·, ·),
N (θ ,r) =
{
(a, b¯) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯)+
(
σ(b¯) ·σ(b¯)T)−1 · zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B
K
∑
i=0
θih(ai,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
where zT = 1r
(
θ1,tUθ1,t , ...,θK,tUθK,t
)
.
For any given (θ ,r), it is trivial that g(a′, b¯)+
(
σ(b¯) ·σ(b¯)T)−1 ·zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯)
is continuous in (θ ,r) because it is a linear in r and is quadratic in θ . Also, ∑Ki=0θi,th(ai,b′, b¯) is
continuous in (θ ,r) because it is linear in θ . Furthermore, for each (θ ,r), there is no restriction
on available (a, b¯).
Then, by the Berge’s Maximum Theorem, we conclude that both g(a′, b¯)+
(
σ(b¯)·σ(b¯)T)−1 ·
zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯) and ∑Ki=0θi,th(ai,b′, b¯) are continuous in (θ ,r). Moreover,N (θ ,r)
is non-empty, compact-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous. Under Assumption 2, since N is
single-valued, it is trivial that the upper-hemicontinuous correspondence N is continuous in
(θ ,r).
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Proof of Proposition 8
For θ ∗ = (0, ...,0), z∗ = 0, and hence
N (z∗,r) =
{
(a, b¯) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈Bh(a,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
For θ ∗ = (θ1, ...,θK) = (0, ...,0,1,0, ...,0) ∈ ∆K−1 where θi = 1 for some i ∈ {1, ...,K}, the
reputation parameter z∗ =
(
0, ...,0, 1r
∂U(θ)
∂θi
∣∣
θi=1
,0, ...,0
)
. By the definition ofN (·, ·),
N (z∗,r) =
{
(a, b¯) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈Bh(a∗i ,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
Therefore,
Ur(θ ∗) ∈ g
(
N (z∗,r)
)
Proof of Theorem 140
Proposition 6 shows that M = ∆K−1 is invariant for
{
θt ∈ ∆K−1
}
t≥0. Since the Markov
equilibrium payoff function should satisfy the optimality equation (14), it is sufficient to show
that there exists an unique solution to the equation (14). By Proposition 8, we do not need
to assign any boundary condition. Under Condition 2, for any compact subset K ⊂ ∆K−1, the
40This proof is based on the proof of Theorem 4.4 in Cannarsa, Da Prato, and Frankowska (2010)
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second-order operator L is uniformly elliptic. In other words,
det Γ(θ)> 0 for any θ ∈ K
This is equivalent with that Γ(·) is positive definite on ∆K−1, which was guaranteed by Condition
2. Denote f (θ) = rg
(
a0(θ), b¯(θ)
)
. For any θ ∈M and given f ,
U fr (θ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsPs f (θ)ds
where Pt is the transition semigroup such that Ps f (θ) = E
[
f (θ ps )
]
with a initial prior θ0 =
p ∈M and a continuous function f (θ) defined on M.
It is well-known41 that
L = lim
h→0+
Ph− I
h
By the Hille-Yosida theorem42, it is known that U fr (θ) satisfies the following:
LU fr (θ)− rU fr (θ) =− f
in M and U fr (θ) ∈ D(L) where D(L) =
{
h ∈C(M) : h ∈ W 2loc(∆K−1), and Lh ∈C(M)
}
with
C(M) is the space of continuous function defined on M.
Next, check the regularity. Since M is a compact set of class C2,1, there is a sequence of
compact domains
{
Mi
}
i∈N of class C
2,1 such that
Mi ⊂ M˙i+1 and ∪∞i=1 Mi = ∆K−1
41See Cannarsa, Da Prato, and Frankowska (2010).
42See Evans (2010).
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where A˙ is the interior of A. For a sufficiently large i ∈ N, define
U fr,i =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsP is f (θ)ds
for θ ∈ Mi and a stopped transition semigroup P is such that: for τi(p) = inf
{
t > 0 : θ pt ∈
∂Mi and θ p0 = p
}
,
P is f (θ) = E
[
f (θ ps )χ{t≤τi(p)}
]
SincePs f (θ)=E
[
f (θ ps )χ{t≤τ}
]
where τ = inf
{
t > 0 : θ pt ∈ ∂M and θ p0 = p
}
, for any bounded
and continuous function f on M,
lim
s→∞P
i
s f (θ) =Ps f (θ)
Therefore, for any θ ∈ ∆K−1, as i→ ∞,
U fr,i→U fr
By Condition 2,
{
θt
}
is non-degenerate in Mi for each i. By the Hille-Yosida theorem, it is
known that U fr,i satisfies the following partial differential equation with boundary conditions:
LU fr,i(θ)− rU fr,i(θ) =− f in Mi
U fr,i = 0 on ∂M
i
and U fr,i ∈W 2(Mi). Since U fr,i→U fr and U fr,i ∈W 2(Mi), we can conclude that U fr ∈W (∆K−1).
From now on, denote U fr =Ur.
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For the uniqueness of Ur, it is sufficient to show that the solution to the following
LUr(θ)− rUr(θ) = 0
for θ ∈M is Ur = 0 on M. Since we already know that Ur ∈C(M), ‖Ur‖∞ where ‖ · ‖∞ is the
supreme norm is bounded. Let B = ‖Ur‖∞ ≥ ∞ and define:
Vr(θ) =
Ur(θ)
r(1+B)
− 1
r
Since Ur ∈W 2loc(∆K−1), it is trivial Vr ∈W 2loc(∆K−1) and Vr(θ)> 0 for any θ ∈ ∆K−1. Further-
more,
LVr(θ)− rVr(θ) =−1
because LUr(θ)− rUr(θ) = 0.
For f (θ) = −1, Ps f (θ) = E
[
f (θ ps )
]
= −1. Hence, on M, Ur =
∫ ∞
0 e
−rsPs f (θ)ds =
−∫ ∞0 e−rsds =−1r . By the definition of Vr(θ),
Vr(θ)≤Ur,i(θ)
for any θ ∈ Mi and sufficiently large i ∈ N because we know that Ur,i(θ) → Ur(θ) = −1r .
Therefore,
Vr(θ)≤−1r
for any θ ∈M. This implies that, for any θ ∈M,
Ur(θ)≤ 0 (20)
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Next, consider the solution to the following
rUr(θ)−LUr(θ) = 0
for θ ∈M. Define:
Vr(θ) =
1
r
− Ur(θ)
r(1+B)
Since Ur ∈W 2loc(∆K−1), it is trivial Vr ∈W 2loc(∆K−1) and Vr(θ)> 0 for any θ ∈ ∆K−1. Further-
more,
rVr(θ)−LVr(θ) = 1
because LUr(θ)− rUr(θ) = 0.
For f (θ)= 1, Ps f (θ)=E
[
f (θ ps )
]
= 1. Hence, on M, Ur =
∫ ∞
0 e
−rsPs f (θ)ds=
∫ ∞
0 e
−rsds=
1
r . By the definition of Vr(θ),
Vr(θ)≤Ur,i(θ)
for any θ ∈ Mi and sufficiently large i ∈ N because we know that Ur,i(θ) → Ur(θ) = −1r .
Therefore,
Vr(θ)≤ 1r
for any θ ∈M. This implies that, for any θ ∈M,
Ur(θ)≥ 0 (21)
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Therefore, by (21) and (22), the solution to the following problem:
LUr(θ)− rUr(θ) = 0
is Ur(θ)≡ 0 for any θ ∈M.
Proof of Lemma 2
Under Condition 2, the optimality equation becomes a non-degenerate second-order elliptic
partial differential equation on ∆K−1 because Γ is positive definite. In other words, for any
nonzero vector x ∈RK and belief θ ∈ ∆K−1,
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)xix j > 0.
Since ∂Dδ/Ωδ is a smooth part of boundary ∂Dδ , we can define the outward normal vector
of which direction cosines are defined and three times continuously differentiable on ∂Dδ/Ωδ .
This implies that, for any outward normal vector ν to ∂Dδ/Ωδ at θ ∈ ∂Dδ/Ωδ
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)νi(θ)ν j(θ)> 0.
Therefore, by Freidlin (1985)43, for any ε > 0, every point of ∂Dδ/Ωδ is a ε-regular point,
which is a strongly regular point. By Proposition 6, it is trivial that Ωδ is an non-attainable set.
43See Theorem 3.4.2 in Freidlin (1985)
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Proof of Proposition 9
For any given δ > 0, we can construct an increasing sequence of subsets
{
Dδ
}
of ∆K−1
that converges to ∆K−1 as δ goes to zero. Fix a sequence
{
δl
}
l∈N satisfying this conditions.
We know that the optimality equation on Dδ is elliptic second-order partial differential equation
and degenerate only on the boundary points that belongs to Ωδ . Since Ωδ is an non-attainable
set in the boundary of Dδ , it is enough to assign a boundary condition only on the ε-regular set,
∂Dδ\Ωδ 44.
Therefore, define the Dirichlet problem on Dδ as following:
LUδ (θ)− rUδ (θ) =−rg(a(θ), b¯(θ)) on Dδ
Uδ (θ) = g
(
a(θ), b¯(θ)
)
on ∂∆εδ
where g(·, ·) is a continuous function on ∆K−1. On Dδl , for any give t > 0, by Dynkin’s formula,
Uδl(θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θt∧τδ ), b¯(θt∧τδ )
)
exp{−r(t ∧ τδ )}
]
+ rEθ
∫ t∧τδ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds
= I+ II
For the second term II, it is clear that
lim
t→∞rEθ
∫ t∧τδ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds = rEθ
∫ τδ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs))exp{−rs}ds
44See Theorem 5.2 in Stroock and Varadhan (1972).
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We rewrite the first term, I, as following:
Eθ
[
g
(
a(θt∧τδ ), b¯(θt∧τδ )
)
exp{−r(t ∧ τδ )}
]
= Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}χ{τδ≤t}
]
+Eθ
[
g
(
a(θt), b¯(θt)
)
exp{−rt}χ{τδ>t}
]
= III+ IV
By the uniform boundedness of g(·, ·), both collections of random variables in III and IV :
{
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}χ{τδ≤t} : t ≥ 0
}
and
{
g
(
a(θt), b¯(θt)
)
exp{−rt}χ{τδ>t} : t ≥ 0
}
are uniformly integrable.
Therefore,
lim
t→∞Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}χ{τδ≤t}
]
= Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}
]
lim
t→∞Eθ
[
g
(
a(θt), b¯(θt)
)
exp{−rt}χ{τδ>t}
]
= 0
We conclude that, for any θ ∈ Dδ , the solution is given by:
Uδ (θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}
]
+ rEθ
∫ τδ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds
Proof of Theorem 2
Fix
{
δi
}
i∈N such that limi→∞ δi = 0. For each δi, by Proposition 10, there exists a solution
Uδi to the approximate problem that is defined on Dδi for each i ∈N. Consider the sequence of
solutions,
{
Uδi
}
i∈N each of whom is bounded, measurable, and continuous almost everywhere
on each Dδi . By the definition of equilibrium payoff, it is also uniformly bounded.
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For each δi > 0, we construct an approximate Dirichlet problem on Dδi . Therefore, it is suf-
ficient to show that the sequence of solution,
{
Uδi
}
i∈N, for each approximate Dirichlet problem
has a pointwise limit, which is the approximate solution to the Dirichlet problem in ∆K−1. We
use the following lemmas. First, not that, by the way of constructing, for any δ1 > δ2 > 0,
Dδ1 ⊆ Dδ2 ⊆ ∆K−1. Then, the first hitting time with respect to Dδ converges to τ as δ goes to
zero.
Lemma 3 limε→0 τε(ω) = τ(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω∗ =
{
ω ′ ∈ Ω ∣∣ τ is achieved.}. For any δ1 >
δ2 > 0 and ω ∈Ωε2 , τδ1(ω)< τδ2(ω) with probability 1.
Proof. Consider ω for which τ could be achieved. Since the diffusion process θt is continuous
with probability 1 from the view of the normal type large player and Dδi increases when the
sequence {δi} converges to zero as i goes to ∞, it is trivial that
{
τδi(ω)
}
is an increasing
sequence of random variables bounded by τ(ω).
Supposed that limε→0 τε(ω) = τ ′(ω) for some τ ′(ω) and P
{
τ ′(ω) < τ(ω)
}
> 0. Then,
there is a t0 > 0 such that:
P
{
τ ′(ω)< t0 < τ(ω)
}
> 0
Therefore, with θ p0 = p,
θ pt0 /∈ ∪∞i=1Dδi P− a.s. on
{
τ ′(ω)< t0 < τ(ω)
}
This implies that:
θt0 ∈ ∂∆K−1 P− a.s. on
{
τ ′(ω)< t0 < τ(ω)
}
, which is a contradiction to the definition of τ . Therefore, limε→0 τε(ω) = τ(ω) for any ω ∈
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Ω∗ =
{
ω ′ ∈Ω ∣∣ τ is achieved.}.
Lemma 4 Under Condition 1, Pθ
{
ω ∈Ω ∣∣ θθτδ (ω) ∈ ∂Dδ\Ωδ}= 1 for any δ > 0.
Proof. By the result of Faingold and Sannikov (2011), under Condition 1, we can conclude that
limt→∞θ0,t = 1 with probability 1 from the perspective of the normal type. For any δ > 0, we
can construct α-neighborhood of 0 ∈ ∆K−1 that is contained in ∆K−1:
Bα(0)
∣∣∣∣
∆K−1
=
{
θ ∈ ∆K−1 ∣∣ |θ |< α}
such that Bα(0)
∣∣
∆K−1 ∩ Dδ = /0 with α > 0. Define d = d(α,δ ) = dist(Bα(0)
∣∣
∆K−1,D
δ ) > 0
that is a distant between Bα(0)
∣∣
∆K−1 and D
δ .
Since limt→∞θ0,t = 1 with probability 1, we can find Tα > 0 such that for all t > Tα , θ0,t ∈
Bα(0)
∣∣
∆K−1 with probability 1. Therefore, with probability 1, we can conclude that the belief
process θt hit the boundary ∂Dδ+d/Ωδ+d . Since δ is arbitrary, we conclude that for any δ > 0,
Pθ
{
ω ∈Ω∣∣θθτδ (ω) ∈ ∂Dδ/Ωδ}= 1.
By the Proposition 9, for any given δi > 0, the solution to an Dirichlet problem on Dδi is
given by:
Uδi(θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδi ), b¯(θτδi )
)
exp{−rτδi}
]
+ rEθ
∫ τδi
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds
= I+ II
For I, since θt is a continuous process with probability 1 and g
(
a(·), b¯(·))e−rτδ is a contin-
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uous and uniformly bounded function on Dδ , the limit as δ → 0 exists and it is given by:
lim
δ→0
g
(
a(θτδ ), b¯(θτδ )
)
exp{−rτδ}= g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
exp{−rτ} a.s.
Since g(·, ·) is uniformly bounded, the following collection of random variables
{
g
(
a(θτδi ), b¯(θτδi )
)
exp{−rτδi} : i ∈ N
}
is uniformly integrable. Therefore,
lim
i→∞
Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτδi ), b¯(θτδi )
)
exp{−rτδi}
]
= Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
exp{−rτ}
]
For each θ ∈Dδ such that θ = (θ1,0, ...,θK,0) and ω ∈Ω∗, since
∫ ∞
0 e
−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds<
∞ is uniformly bounded,
{
νδ (θ)=
∫ τδ
0 e
−rsg(a(θs, b¯(θs))ds
∣∣ δ > 0} is also a uniformly bounded
and increasing sequence on the real line by Lemma 5 when δ goes to zero.
Therefore, by Bonzano-Weierstrass theorem, it has a pointwise limit. In other words,
lim
i→∞
νδi(θ) =
∫ limi→∞ τδi
0
e−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds =
∫ τ
0
e−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds
by Lemma 4.
Again, by the dominated convergence theorem and Lemma 5,
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lim
i→∞
rEθ
∫ τδi
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds = rEθ
{
lim
i→∞
∫ τδi
0
e−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds
}
= rEθ
{∫ limi→∞ τδi
0
e−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds
}
= rEx
{∫ τ
0
e−rsg
(
a(θs), b¯(θs)
)
ds
}
Therefore, we can conclude that for any given θ ∈ ∆K−1, {Uδi(θ)}δi∈N has a pointwise
limit as i→ ∞, which is given by:
lim
i→∞
Uδi(θ) = Eθ
[
g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
exp{−rτ}
]
+ rEθ
∫ τ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds
≡U(θ)
This U(θ) is the approximate Markov equilibrium payoff to the normal type large player
when the prior is given at θ ∈ ∆K−1.
Proof of Proposition 10
We use Proposition 5.5.22 in Karatzas and Shreve (2012) to prove this proposition. Let
Iδ = (δ ,1−δ ) for 0 < δ < 12 . First, under Condition 1, γ0(θ ′) = θ ′0σ−1(b¯)
(
µ0−µθ ′
) 6= 0 and
hence γ20 (θ
′) > 0 for any θ ′ ∈ ∆0δ =
{
θ ∈ ∆0∣∣δ < θ < 1− δ}. For each θ0 ∈ Iδ , γ0(θ ′) =
γ0(1−θ0) =
[
γ0(θ ′)
]
(θ0) is a function in θ0 ∈ Iδ because θ0+θ ′ = 1.
We can find a constant A > 0 and ε > 0, such that
∫ θ0+ε
θ0−ε
1+
∣∣[γ20 (θ ′)](y)/y∣∣[
γ20 (θ ′)
]
(y)
dy < A
∫ θ0+ε
θ0−ε
1
y
= A
{
log(θ0+ ε)− log(θ0− ε)
}
< θ0
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where θ ′ ∈ ∆0y for each y ∈ (θ0− ε,θ0+ ε).
Let Sδ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : θ0,t /∈ Iδ
}
be the first hitting time when the belief of normal type escapes
Iδ . For any t > 0, under Condition 1,
P
{∫ t∧Sδ
0
[
γ20 (θ
′)
]
(θ0,s)
(
1+
1
θ0,s
)
ds < ∞
}
= 1
because limt→∞θ0,t = 1 with probability 1 under the normal type large player.
For the weak solution θ0 =
{
θ0,t
}
t≥0 to the stochastic differential equation:
dθ0,t =
γ0(θ1,t) · γ0(θ1,t)
θ0,t
dt+ γ0(θ1,t) ·dZnt
, it is trivial that
P
{
θt∧Sδ = θ0,0+
∫ t
0
[
γ0(θ1,s)
]
(θ0,s) ·
[
γ0(θ1,s)
]
(θ0,s)
θ0,s
χ{s≤Sδ }ds
+
∫ t
0
[
γ0(θ1,s)
]
(θ0,s) ·χ{s≤Sδ }dZns
∣∣∣∣ 0≤ t < ∞}= 1
Since the score function s(x) =
∫ x
c e
−∫ yc 2z dzdy =−c2x + c for any c > 0, on θ0 ∈ Iδ , s(δ+)>
−∞ and s((1−δ )−)<∞where s((1−δ )−)= limθ0↗(1−δ ) s(θ0) and s(δ+)= limθ0↘δ s(θ0).
Therefore, as δ → 0,
Pθ0
{
lim
t→Sδ
θ0,t = δ
}
= 1−Pθ0
{
lim
t→Sδ
θ0,t = 1−δ
}
=
s
(
(1−δ )− )− s(θ0)
s
(
(1−δ )− )− s(δ+)
=
δ (1−δ −θ0)
θ0(1−2δ ) → 0
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This implies that Pθ0
{
inf0≤t≤Sδ θt > δ
}
→ 1 as δ → 0 for any θ0 ∈ Iδ .
For θ0 ∈ I = (0,1), since s(0+) = −∞ and s(1−) < ∞, by Proposition 5.5.22 in Karatzas
and Shreve (2012),
Pθ0
{
lim
t→S
θ0,t = 1
}
= Pθ0
{
inf
0≤t<S
θ0,t > 0
}
= 1
where S = T0∧T1.
Proof of Corollary 2
By Proposition 10,
Pθ0
{
lim
t→S
θ0,t = 1
}
= Pθ0
{
inf
0≤t<S
θ0,t > 0
}
= 1
This implies that, at the first hitting time τ > 0, the belief process does not touch the point that
is sufficiently close to where θ1 = 1 before it touch some point near θ1 = 0. Therefore,
Eθ0
[
g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
e−rτ
]
= g
(
a(θτ), b¯(θτ)
)
Eθ0
[
e−rτ
]
= g
(
a∗, b¯∗
)
Eθ0
[
e−rτ
]
where
(
a∗, b¯∗
) ∈N (0,r). Therefore, by Theorem 2,
U(θ) = g(a∗, b¯∗)Eθ
[
exp{−rτ}]+ rEθ ∫ τ
0
g
(
a0(θs), b¯(θs)
)
exp{−rs}ds (22)
where
(a∗, b¯∗) ∈
{
(a, b¯) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯), and b ∈ argmaxb′∈Bh(a,b′, b¯) ∀b ∈ supp b¯
}
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Proof of Proposition 11
Fix θt ∈ ∆K−1 and r > 0. By definition ofN (θt ,r),
N (θt ,r) =
{
(a, b¯t) : a ∈ argmaxa′∈Ag(a′, b¯t)+
(
σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T
)−1 · zT ·

µ1−µθt
...
µK−µθt
µ(a′, b¯t)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B
K
∑
i=0
θih(ai,t ,b′, b¯t) ∀b ∈ supp b¯t
}
where zT = 1r
(
θ1,tUθ1,t , ...,θK,tUθK,t
)
, for
(
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)
) ∈N (θt ,r) and any i ∈ {1, ...,K},
g
(
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt))−θi,tg(a∗i , b¯t(θt)
)
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T )−1
· 1
r
K
∑
i=1
θi,t
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
(
µi(θt)−µθt (θt)
) · (θi,tµi(θt)−µ0(θt))
where µi(θt)= µ
(
a∗i , b¯t(θt)
)
and µ0(θt)= µ
(
a0,t
(
θt), b¯t(θt)
)
. For the sake of simplicity, denote
g0(θt) = g
(
a0,t
(
θt), b¯t(θt)
)
and gi(θt) = g
(
a∗i , b¯t(θt)
)
. Hence,
g
(
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)
)− K∑
i=0
θi,tg
(
a∗i , b¯t(θt)
)
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T )−1
· 1
r
K
∑
i=1
θi,t
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
(
µi(θt)−µθt (θt)
) · (µθt (θt)−µ0(θt))
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Denote gθt (θt) = ∑Ki=0θi,tg
(
a∗i , b¯t(θt)
)
. Then,
g
(
a0,t(θt), b¯t(θt)
)−gθt (θt)≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T)−1
· 1
r
K
∑
i=1
θi,t
∂U(θt)
∂θi,t
(
µi(θt)−µθt (θt)
) · (µθt (θt)−µ0(θt))
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T)−1
·C1
r
K
∑
i=1
θi,t
(
µi(θt)−µθt (θt)
) · (µθt (θt)−µ0(θt))
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T)−1
·C1
r
(
µθt (θt)−µ0(θt)
) · (µθt (θt)−θ0,tµ0− (1−θ0,t)µθt (θt))
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T)−1C1θ0,tr
∣∣∣∣µθt (θt)−µ0(θt)∣∣∣∣2
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T)−1C1C2θ0,tr
∣∣∣∣θ0,ta0,t(θt)+ K∑
i=1
θi,ta∗i −a0,t(θt)
∣∣∣∣2
≥ (σ(b¯t) ·σ(b¯t)T )−1θ0,t(1−θ0,t)C1C2r
∣∣∣∣a0,t(θt)− K∑
i=1
θi,t
1−θ0,t a
∗
i
∣∣∣∣2
where the second inequality is from Condition 3(a) and the fifth inequality is from Condition
3(b).
Let g = maxθt∈∆K−1 g(at(θt), b¯t(θt)) and g = minθt∈∆K−1 g(at(θt), b¯t(θt)) for any uniformly
bounded g(·, ·). Then, the right-hand side is bounded by g−g. Therefore, as r goes to zero,
∣∣∣∣a0,t(θt)− K∑
i=1
θi,t
1−θ0,t a
∗
i
∣∣∣∣2 → 0
This convergence result holds for any θt ∈ ∆K−1. Hence, as the normal type large player be-
comes sufficiently patient, the equilibrium action converges to a convex combination of all the
other commitment types’ actions.
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Proof of Theorem 3
By Condition 5(a), β ∈ ∆K−1. Let Fi =
{
θ ∈ RK−1 : βi ≤ θi ≤ 1
}
for i ∈ {1, ...,K} and
F0 =
{
θ ∈ RK−1 : ∑Ki=1θi ≤ 1
}
. It is trivial that F = ∩Ki=1Fi is a compact subset in RK−1.
For each θ ∈ F and i ∈ {1, ...,K}, the distance from θ to Fi, δFi(θ), is θi− βi. Therefore,
∇δFi(θ)T = (0, ...,0,1,0, ...,0) where the i-th component is 1.
Every θ ∈ ∂F belongs to ∂Fj for at most one j ∈ {0,1, ...,K}. Fix k ∈ {1, ...,K}. For such
a θ ∈ ∂Fk, γk(θ) = 0 by Condition 5(b). Therefore,
〈
Γ∇δFk(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂Fk , ∇δFk(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂Fk
〉
=
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)νki (θ)ν
k
j (θ) = γ
2
k (θ) = 0.
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product defined on RK×RK and νk is the outward normal to ∂Fk at θ .
Furthermore, for θ ∈ ∂Fk,
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)
∂ 2δFk(θ)
∂θi∂θ j
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Fk
+
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δFk(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Fk
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δFk(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂Fk
=
γk(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
= 0.
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For j = 0 and θ ∈ ∂F0,
〈
Γ∇δF0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂F0 , ∇δF0(θ)
∣∣
θ∈∂F0
〉
=
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)ν0i (θ)ν
0
j (θ)
=
{ K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)
}2
= γ0(θ)2 = 0
because γ0(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ ∂F0.
In the similar way,
1
2
K
∑
i, j=1
γi(θ)γ j(θ)
∂ 2δF0(θ)
∂θi∂θ j
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂F0
+
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δF0(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂F0
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
∂δF0(θ)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
θ∈∂F0
=
K
∑
i=1
γi(θ)γ0(θ)
θ0
= 0.
Therefore, F is an invariant set, and hence, the interior of F denoted by F˙ is also an invariant
set. This implies that for any θ ∈ F˙ :
P
{
θt ∈ F˙ : ∀t ≥ 0
}
= 1
In the similar way of Theorem 1, we can conclude that there exist a unique Markov equilib-
rium payoff function, UF˙(·), that satisfies the optimality equation on F˙ . Suppose Condition 3
is imposed on the UF˙(·). For any θ ∈ F˙ , denote α = min{d1, ...,dK} where di =
∣∣A∗(θ)−a∗i ∣∣.
Since F is strictly included in ∆K−1, di > 0 for any i ∈ {1, ...,K}. Therefore, for any j ∈
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{1, ...,K} and θ ∈ F˙ ,
∣∣A∗(θ)−a∗j∣∣≥ α > 0.
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